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ABSTRACT
The study examines the industrial policy in Britain, France, Germany and in the 
European Union, and this policy’s capacity to shape industrial outcomes and structures. 
It analyses the political and economic considerations which affect the industrial policy­
making procedures. I argue that the discussion on industrial policy is still too strongly 
influenced by the debates of free trade and interventionism This overlooks two facts: 
governments have always played an influential role in industrial affairs and thus, all the 
activities which are made to shape industrial outcomes are political as much as 
economic. This argument is backed up by focusing on state and economy linkages 
where state aids and subsidies constitute the most influential tool in economic and 
industrial policy-making. Also the descriptive parts on industrialization in selected 
European Union helps to give on historical depth to the argument. Against this 
background, the study traces the European Union’s industrial policy from the Treaty of 
Paris in 1951 to the adaptation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It concludes that 
today, the Community policy remains to be uncoordinated and underdeveloped. I'his 
does not constitute a clear and consistent framework for the European industry. The 
study suggests that industrial policy should be developed and implemented as a 
coherent framework with a liberal and competitive approach. Thus, Europe can face 
the world markets and become a global player.
ÖZET
Bu araştırmada, İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya’nın Avrupa Birliği çerçevesindeki ortak 
sanayi politikalan ve bu politikalann endüstriyel yapılan şekillendirme kapasiteleri 
İncelenmektedir. Sanayi politikalarını belirleme sürecinde etkili olan ekonomik ve 
siyasal konular ele alınmaktadır. Arastırmalanma göre sanayi politikasi konusu hala 
serbest ticaret ve müdahalecilik tartışmalanndan büyük ölçüde etkilenmektedir. Bu 
durum iki faktörün gözardı edilmesine sebep olmaktadır: Devletler sanayi konusunda 
daima etkili olmuşlardır ve bu nedenle sanayi alanında atılan tüm adımlar ekonomik 
olduğu kadar politiktir. Çalışmamda bu görüş, devlet - ekonomi bağlantılan ele 
alınarak analiz edilmiş; sanayi politikalarının belirlenmesi konusunda en etkili araç 
sayılan devlet yardım ve teşviklerini incelemek süreliyle desteklenmektedir. Aynca 
onyedinci yüzyıldan Avrupa Birliği’nin oluşumuna kadar geçen dönemde seçilmiş 
Avrupa ülkelerinin sanayileşme süreçleri konusundaki betimleyici bölümler araştırmada 
öne sürülen görüşe tarihsel bir bakış açısı kazandırmaktadır. Bu temel üzerine kurulan 
çalışmamın son bölümünde Paris Antlaşmasından (1951) Maastricht Antlaşması’na 
(1992) kadar olan dönem arasında Avrupa Birliği sanayi politikasının gelişimi 
İncelenmektedir. Araştırma sonrasında. Topluluğun sanayi politikasının koordinasyon 
sorunlan olan ve gelişmemiş bir politika olduğu sonucuna vanimıştır. Bu durum 
Avrupa sanayi açısından belirsizlik ve iktidarsızlık arz etmektedir. Araştırmamda 
sanayi politikasının liberal, rekabetçi ve tutarlı bir çerçevede geliştirilmesi gerektiği 
vurgulanmaktadır. Böylece Avrupa, dünya pazarlarında etkili bir rol üstlenebilecektir.
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INTRODUCTION
L I Scope and Objectives
The emergence of industries and industrial structures greatly affected the development 
and governing of the growth-oriented economies of Western Europe. Governments of 
these countries are perceived as responsible for economic performance. They intervene in 
markets to set prices, to dictate conditions of supply and demand, and even to organize 
and direct industrial activities.
The aim of this thesis is to focus on the capacities of the different Western 
European political and administrative structures, namely Britain, France and Germany, 
and the European Union as a whole to intervene in the economy to shape industrial 
outcomes and structures. It is assumed that all the activities which are made to shape 
industrial outcomes are political as much as economic; and such interventions by the 
governments have been used both to retard and to facilitate industrial change through the 
years.
During the 1970s, the economies of Western countries deteriorated considerably 
and this generated a new debate about the proper role of government in the economy.
Adjusting and reorienting economic priorities in a global economy, where technology 
and demand patterns are rapidly changing, has become a fundamental political challenge. 
Thus, interest in more coherent national policies that affect the economy has increased. 
This study concentrates on the public policies that affect the industry. “Since the 
fullfillment of domestic demands, in part, depends upon success in maintaining the 
domestic industrial base, nations must influence the evolution of this base.”' The interest 
in national industrial policy is not new. Governments have proceeded with systematic 
and conscious efforts in order to influence the evolution of their national industrial 
structures. The study will analyse this trend through the years since the beginning of 
industrialization in Western European countries. In such advanced industrialized nations 
these systematic efforts involve the protection and upgrading of existing industries and 
the introduction of new ones.^ Today, three powerful and interacting forces are speeding 
up the process of economic transformations. These are:
i) the intensity of international competition,
ii) the cumulative impact of research and innovation,
iii) the enhanced importance of customer service.
These forces seem to be operating in each national economy.^ However, the 
intensity of international competition influences and in some situations limits the 
domestic goals regarding industries. The political and economic dimensions of 
globalization have created difficulties. These have led to numerous exceptions in trade 
liberalization in order to stabilize existing market shares and the distribulition of
industry. In a broader sense, national interventions can be seen as only one element 
influencing the international distribution of industry.
Susan Strange calls attention to two other critical developments contributing to 
the rapid global economic transformations:
i) the liberalization of international finance,
ii) the steady and cumulative lowering of the real costs of transborder transport and 
communication.
Strange argues that the result of these changes is greatly intensified competition among 
states for world market shares. This competition is forcing states to bargain with both 
foreign and national firms in order to exchange benefits and opportunities. The main 
theme in the article is, “seemingly unrelated developments in world politics and world 
business have common roots and are the result in large part of the same structural 
changes in the world economy and society.”“* Also, the nature of the competition between 
states has changed, so that macroeconomic management and industrial policies may 
often be equally or even more important for goverments than conventional foreign 
policies.
L2 What is Industrial Policy?
In its traditional sense, industrial policy implies government intervention to underwrite 
specific enterprises or sectors, “whose survival the government deems essential for 
socioeconomic or strategic reasons.”  ^ The instruments of such a policy could include 
loans, grants, tax concessions, guaranteed procurement contracts, export assistance and
certain trade barriers. Countries in the industrialized world have had industrial policies 
for a long time. For instance, they have distorted market signals by means of 
differentiated tariffs. Such interventions establish a system of incentives and 
disincentives which affect the pattern of industrial production and allocation of 
resources. Even by deciding on the relative supply of public goods, such as health, 
education, communications and defense governments affect the structure of industry. For 
example, by changing income distribution through transfers, governments affect demand 
and hence, industrial change.*^  Therefore, industrial policy embraces all acts and policies 
of the state that affect industry. These policies can be aimed at to expand the gross 
national product in order to deal with structural problems such as unequal distribution 
of income, regional under-development and insufficient opportunities for employment. 
On the other hand, such policies can be linked with relatively higher goals that depend 
upon the level of national development. For instance, policies toward industry have been 
used to further national unification: the case of France since 1945; and as in the case of 
the European Union, the evolution of a European industrial network as the result of the 
establishment of a Custom’s Union.’ In this sense industrial policy is nothing new and 
forms part of the traditional attributes of government. Although left-wing governments 
are characterized as being for government intervention in industrial affairs, certain right- 
wing ones are also proponents of intervention. This demonstrates that nationalism as 
much as ideology underpins the pursuit of an interventionist industrial policy.
“A laissez faire approach is the opposite form of industrial policy and is often associated 
with right-wing governments. Even if they deliberately eschew direct intervention,
however, governments have an enormous influence on industrial planning and 
production. Public contracts and defense-related procurement are obvious ways in which 
all governments, regardless of political persuasion, intentionally or unintentionally assist
national manufacturers 978
Public policies toward industry may be a decisive element in turning a static 
private sector into a dynamic one. On the other hand, it can be the other way around. 
Industrial policies can be either positive or negative. They can be positive and forward 
looking; aiming to assist the process of structural change either by promoting new 
industries and high technology or by helping old ones to restructure. It can be negative 
where it attempts to slow down, or prevent the structural change and keeps declining 
sectors alive through artificial respiration. The positive ones’ purpose is clear which is 
to raise productivity , maintain competitiveness, thus secure higher standards of living. 
The negative ones’ purpose is more ambiguous. It raises incomes in the protected 
industry to the disadvantage of the others. Negative industrial policy reduces national 
income below what it would have been in its absence. One must seek non-economic 
justifications for negative policy. The most frequently given reason being the need to 
save jobs and to avoid social and political tensions arising from an abrupt loss of 
viability in a particular sector. “Understandable human emotions, ranging from 
compassion for the victims of market fluctuations to fear of loss of public office on the 
part of elected representatives leads to the adaptation of negative industrial policies in 
the short-run.’” The distinction often becomes blurred in practice. This is because 
governments are permanently tom between economic efficiency and political 
expediency and will try to find a middle road.
1.3 Outline of the Study
The study is divided into five main parts. After the introduction part, economic and 
political theories relevant to the topic are explained. Following this part state and 
economy linkages are examined through the role of the state and economic policy­
making procedures of the Western European states. Sate aids and subsidies are included 
in this chapter since these are the major instruments of government interventionism into 
economy. After the establishment of the European Umon, the Community has assumed 
regulatory and legislative activities concerning the allocation of aids and subsidies 
among the member states. These are explained in the last part of this chapter.
The fourth part is titled Industrial Policy in Europe. In order to give a full scope 
to the study a historical background of capitalism and industrialization is given at the 
beginning of the chapter. The years after World War II are studied under a different 
section bringing the topic to this date. Following this, contemporary business and 
government relations in the European Union are analysed. European Union’s industrial 
policy is thoroughly examined in this chapter as well. In the concluding part European 
industry is investigated . Special attention is given to main industrial sectors as steel, 
textile, chemical and service industries. The fifth part is the conclusion of the thesis 
where all the data are summarized in perspective and concluding remarks are offered
Chapter II
THEORIES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
The role of the state in economic affairs expanded markedly during and between two 
world wars. Governments were forced to attain maximum output from their limited 
resources. After World War II certain issues emerged as topics for debate: the
development of welfare state, and the dismantling of the welfare state for better 
international competition. This brought with itself the proper limits of government 
intervention to industry. The central theoretical question since Adam Smith is “whether 
or not the competitive market system, left to its own devices, free of government 
intervention, will produce superior results, in terms of efficiency and social justice than 
any other alternative systems Of economic organization.”’ This particular question has 
provoked debates as global industrial transformations intensify. The supporters of the 
liberal paradigm argue that governments should:
i) restrict their range of activities,
ii) . reduce their system of state provided welfare,
iii) privatize public services,
iv) reform their own operations in accordance with market concepts of competition and 
efficiency.
The belief in “government by the market” rests upon the proposition that the 
market system is a better method while the political process is subject to numerous 
imperfections and distortions. The current defenders of the market are rejecting the 
dominance of the state and stressing the importance of liberty for the economic sector 
and the individual. The competitive market system is favored because it is assumed to 
generate greater economic and consumer choice. The roots of economic liberalism lie in 
the European liberalism that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a 
social and political movement. Liberal theorists, John Locke (1632 - 1704) in particular, 
asserted that government should be understood to arise from a voluntary association of 
free, equal and rational individuals. These individuals are joined together in civil society 
to protect their natural rights to life, liberty and property. Government, therefore, had no 
other end than the preservation and regulation of these basic rights “for the good of the 
people who retained the ultimate authority to remove or alter any government practising
schemes otherwise.’î4
2A Economic Liberalism
Liberalism assumes that individuals have the capacity to reason rationally and are 
therefore able to express and pursue their own interests without the intervention of any 
state system. Liberal arguments about economic efficiency and wealth maximization are 
pursued by linking private property rights with self-regulating markets. The supporters ot 
these markets, particularly Adam Smith, conceive the market not simply as a means of 
economic exchange but also as a system permitting human freedom and liberty. Adam 
Smith spoke of the market operating as if by the action of an invisible hand. Instead of
the conscious design of the state, the market more or less regulated itself, “relying only 
on a minimum of state support to secure a stable legal framework”.^  The mechanism by 
which markets regulated themselves is seen in this tradition as the price mechanism. The 
essential feature of the price mechanism is its capacity to regulate and bring into 
equilibrium the demand for and the supply of commodities. Thus economic liberalism 
emerged as one part of a more general development of liberalism and it represents one of 
the most enduring traditions seeking to explain the nature and dynamics of economic life. 
It is concerned with the proof for the hypothesis that “private property rights maximize 
the capacity of economic systems to satisfy human wants in a flexible and technically 
efficient manner.”  ^The implication of this is that under communal rights, no one has an 
individual stake in the effective management of resources, while under private property 
rights, every individual owner has. Economic liberalism had some difficulty in 
responding to the expansion of government:
“Outside Britain and the USA, the impact of liberalism on 
intellectual opinion and government policy-making in the last 
two-hundred years has generally been far less than nationalism 
and various types of conservative or radical demands for social 
protection from adverse consequences of the market.”
The expansion of the government reflects the dominance of self-interested 
political alliances over public expenditure. The fear of social life being dominated by 
uncontrollable economic processes has become intensified by the globalization of a
world economic system. The anxiety is that global economic institutions and processes 
are increasingly becoming more powerful than either nation-states or social movements 
seeking to regulate economic life; although there is always a body of thought that 
supports the view that economic resources determine strategic and diplomatic power. 
Analysts have pointed out the ways in which a country’s gross national product, the 
quantity and quality of its resources and its international trade and financial position 
determine its military strength. For instance, the early industrialization of Great Britain in 
the nineteenth century was a significant resource base for British political power and an 
important factor in Great Britain’s domination of that century’s international economic 
and political structure.
2.2 Comparative Advantase
Liberal optimists’ trade theory serves to explain through the principles of comparative 
advantage why industrial expansion and competition will be complementary to each 
other, rather than forming a source of continuing domestic and international antagonism. 
The traditional liberal model for trade assumes slow changes in comparative advantages 
that will reduce the pressure for rapid adjustments. Increasingly, national trade, industrial 
and adjustment policies have been and remain necessary responses to the effects of 
international trade liberalization, for the model does not correspond to the reality of 
interstate economic relations.^
Traditional trade theory tends to hide the constantly shifting and positively 
created character of advantage. This hides both the real stakes in many trade conflicts
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and the role that government plays in plotting the course of national industrial 
development. According to the modem theory of international trade, free trade 
encourages countries to export in sectors where they have a comparative advantage; and 
import others in the production of which they have no comparative advantage. 
“Comparative advantage is usually assumed to depend on relative factor proportions or 
availabilities, under the assumption that all countries have access to the same production 
technology and differ merely in their endowments of factors of production.” ’^
The influence of government policies on the dynamics of comparative advantage 
over time becomes clear when there is the possibility of different production technologies 
in different countries. Government policies can turn a competitive disadvantage in capital 
or education intensive industries into a comparative advantage. Thus, national 
comparative advantage is in part the product of national policies over time, since in a 
wide range of industries, a nation creates its own comparative advantage by the efforts of 
its industries and government. In short, in advanced industrial economies comparative 
advantage is more or less understood as the cumulative effect of firm capacities and 
government policy choices.' ‘
As liberal capitalism in the post-war international economy has resulted in the 
mobility of capital, industry and technology across national frontiers, government control 
over the private sector has been undermined. This has made it more difficult for policy 
makers to achieve domestic goals that require some capacity on their part to insure the 
competitiveness of the domestic industries. Consequently, a shift in the balance of public
II
and private power has been taking place as governments increasingly intervene to modify 
the impact of domestic and international market forces on their industrial structures. The 
intellectual basis for these new doctrines comes from market theory (which defends the 
virtues of competitive markets) and public choice models which study the problems and 
limitations of the democratic political process.
2.3 Perfect Competition Model
The neo-classical model of perfect competition as the paradigm of an efficient economy 
assumes that the economy approximates the assumptions of perfect competition. It also 
assumes that it is costlessly coordinated and that the achievement of a pareto-optimal 
state is worthy of merit. By using this model, it is possible to produce an analysis of the 
reasons for state intervention. One can do this by examining the extent to which the 
assumptions of perfect competition are not met.
This is a model of an ideal economy. It shows what an economy would have to 
look like if it were to generate the most efficient output. The markets practising this may 
eventually deviate from its assumptions and can be considered to ‘fail’. Such cases of 
market failure, then, serve as necessary conditions for state intervention in the economy. 
However, the economy that exists today is complex and there are no simple solutions. 
Governments, also, make mistakes when intervening in the market. So, government 
failure should be balanced against market failure.
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2,4 Liberal Defense o f Market
Liberty means the absence of constraints. Government constrains the market when it 
interferes. However, the market is voluntary to its participants and so economic freedom 
from government interference could not enhance political freedom. According to the 
system of natural liberty, the state has only three duties;
i) the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent 
societies.
ii) the duty of protecting every member of the society from the injustice or apprehension 
of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice.
iii) the duty of maintaining certain public works and institutions which it can never be for 
the interest of any individual or individuals to maintain.'^
The market must maintain neutrality between individuals and must be free from 
government interference. However, laissez faire cannot be anarchic; it must be confined 
by rules. Since the market itself is a social institution, it must have rules or constitutions. 
These rules then define the role of government and the limits of competition. The 
problem that comes up here is how to frame these rules. “What is a fair competition?” It 
is especially on this question that the laissez faire advocates of the market turn to the 
liberal theorists of the state. The modem liberal theoiy, as developed most notably by 
Nozick (1974) on the right and Rawls (1971) on the left, seeks to justify the principles of 
a social arrangement, by asking what individuals would choose if they were abstracted 
from the society.
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Only infrastructurally strong states can enable the rise and development of 
modem capitalism. States in Europe became strong and institutionally autonomous from 
the economy, which is an essential prerequisite for capitalism’s emergence. The 
relationship of the economy and the state in the rise of capitalism is governed by a simple 
paradox. As the state became institutionally insulated from the economy, it 
simultaneously became interactively intertwined with the economy. However this process 
did not occur spontaneously but was made intentionally and unintentionally by states. 
During the period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, the impact of the 
political structure on the economic structure of mercantilism was profound. All 
international economic transactions were regulated for the purpose of state power. 
During this time, states gave subsidies to certain industries and in the case of some states, 
they engaged in production and trade. Mercantilist states acquired colonies both for 
favorable trade balances and for self-sufficiency. Thus, in this period the emerging state 
and the state system had in large part determined economic interaction. However, with 
the chance of political structure in the nineteenth century, the economic system also 
changed. This time the main feature of the system was the balance of power on the 
continent. Great Britain with its naval and overseas power played a balancing role on the
continent. 15
“The states prepared the way for the free market; had states abstained from 
intervention of any sort, capitalism would never have been bom. In short, it was not that 
states stifled capitalist development and needed therefore to withdraw from the economy, 
but rather that economic development could only be propelled forward by the actions of
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states, embedded within the economy.” '^  In the long run, the state cannot simultaneously 
improve the conditions of capital and reduce the difficulties of realization. If the rate of 
profit decreases, there will also be a fall in the accumulation of capital even if the market 
is expanding. No combination of private and state regulation of the economy has 
managed to achieve in the long run the miracle of a rising rate of profit and an expanding 
market.*^
From the 60s, governments in many Western societies experimented with a range 
of microeconomic policies designed to extend their influence over private economic 
decision making. They devised various kinds of income policies and industrial policies to 
coordinate the activities of the major economic organizations of capital and labor in 
order to achieve national objectives. A middle way was sought, as a means of exerting 
political influence in the economy without undermining the institution of private 
property. However, the ability of the state to coordinate economic decision making is a 
political ability based on a political relationship between the state and the organizations 
that structure the economy.
2,5 Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory, as articulated and developed by James Buchanan and his associates 
during the last thirty years, seeks to extend the analytical framework of economic 
liberalism to the political process. It represents the application of economic methodology 
to the study of politics. In principle, it is not wedded to any particular political belief, but 
its inquiries are shaped by its strongly individualist and rationalist assumptions. These
15
assumptions lead to an adverse view of the capacity of governments to satisfy individual 
wants compared to economic markets. The public choice assumptions are those used to 
justify the market system in classical economics. The rationality of the market system, 
according to the public choice theory, depends upon the opportunities which it provides 
for rational choice, not upon the assumption that these wilt always be fully taken.
Public choice writers model the study of politics upon the methods and principles 
of neo-classical market economics. Therefore, the methodology of this theory is 
economics and the basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics is, that 
man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer. Hence, private interest will dominate 
decision making in a large number of cases. “The whole political system can be viewed 
as a gigantic market for the demand and supply of public goods, meaning all outputs 
supplied through a political instead of a market process.
2.6 Theory of Political Economy
For the twenty five years following World War II, a wide-spread consensus reigned in 
Western Europe that the social welfare state was the only viable form of liberal 
democracy. However, this brought with itself the view that the state increasingly appears 
to be a coercive agent whose oppressive potential must be limited as much as possible to 
preserve individual liberty. Critics from the right claimed for an ever narrower range of 
legitimate governmental action with ever broader scope for the market forces; while the 
left view argued that more public supervision of private activity is necessary to achieve 
the egalitarian goals.^*
16
Economists who advocate the use of the market forces to implement public policy argue 
that economic incentives tend to work better than direct regulation or command for three 
related reasons:
i) although all government regulations rest upon the threat of coercion, economic 
transactions take place on the basis of consent. One trades only when one thinks that an 
exchange is in one’s interest and the resulting action is voluntary.
ii) government regulation or direction often presupposes knowledge that is not actually 
available. Lack of reliable or accurate information is one of the major reasons policies 
often fail to achieve their extended effects.
iii) the decentralization of market decisions, spread among millions of consumers and 
producers, makes it much more difficult for the sector most ‘hurt’ to change or to block 
any innovation or adjustment."
Economic analysis of specific regulatory policies all suggested that government 
intervention should be reduced. Individualism or freedom had to be defended as the 
primary political end which mandated limits on government. Different defenses of liberty 
emerged that are eventually related to economic liberalism as well. Milton Friedman 
supported the view that individual liberty is and ought to be our primary political goal. 
Liberty is maximized when there is least government. According to this view when 
government cannot be altogether avoided, it should be as decentralized as possible. 
According to Friedman government must be limited and its power must be dispersed
2.6.a The Right View:
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In the works of Friedrich Hayek one finds the most systematic and comprehensive 
20th century statement of the classical liberal conception of the role and limits of the 
state. Hayek sees the principal economic functions of the state as having to do with the 
maintenance and improvement of the institutions which sustain market processes. 
Hayek’s conception of the liberal state has several distinctive features. First, his case for 
the market is one which rests upon the inevitable imperfections of market processes and 
not upon the barely coherent fiction of perfect competition. Second, the conception of 
government is not that of minimum state. Hayek argues that “the state has service 
functions which include the supply of some public goods, the provision of a minimum 
level of security against severe deprivation and the adaptation of measures for the 
improvement of market competition. Although this may not sound like a minimum state 
defended by such liberals as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Herbert Spencer and Robert 
Nozick, Hayek’s conception is still a strictly limited government”.
In The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich Hayek argues that freedom must be the 
primary goal because it constitutes the necessary condition for the attainment of morality 
as well as material well-being. Hayek observes that individuals develop their particular 
talents, characteristics and preferences only in the society of others. Hayek’s agnostic 
approach to the problem of distributive justice has been challenged by the libertarian 
thinker Robert Nozick: “People will not long accept a distribution they believe is unjust.” 
To argue, as Hayek does, that market distribution merely reflects the perceived value of a
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person’s services to others ignores the fact that some have more wealth or income with 
which to express their perceptions of value than do others.
As Friedman and Flayek claim, the market operates as a system of proportional 
representation in which each group registers its preferences without coercing others. 
According to Nozick since there are only individuals, the only justification for 
governmental “services” or coercion must be found in the desires or consent of the 
individuals concerned. Taxing one to benefit another is the equivalent of taking 
someone’s labor or imposing partial slavery. No one and hence no one’s labor (or its 
product) can Justly be sacrificed to someone else and thus no redistributive social policy 
can be just. This was the extreme right view.
Another concept developed by the right view thinkers is welfare capitalism. 
Originally it is developed by the Swedish sociologist Esping-Andersen to conceptualize 
the increased state role. “Welfare capitalism represents a social formation in which 
capitalist market and the commodity-based relations have been modified by the 
regulating impact of a welfare state.”"*’ Esping-Andersen sees the welfare state as an 
initiator and shaper of economic and social relationships. This shows the accumulation of 
political power able to challenge the power ot private capital.
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The critics on the left tend to argue that the market economy is not properly conceived 
as a string of individual acts or decisions; exchange is rather an essentially social process. 
It takes at least two parties to trade and the interaction of many more to get the 
advantages of specialization or an extensive division of labor. If economic interaction 
involves all the members of a given society, the benefits ought to be attributed to the 
community as a whole. Where a large portion of the populace remains economically 
disadvantaged, especially in the midst of prosperity, the legitimacy of the existing mode 
of political and economic organization comes seriously into question. In order to achieve 
real social responsibility in economic enterprise, more direct public ownership and 
control are necessary, since the economic and political resources of the respective groups 
are highly unequal. Thus critics on the left call for more governmental interference in
2. 6, b. The Left View:
the economy. 28
When the economy does not perform to popular satisfaction, the majority 
‘rationally’ seeks to use its political influence to make economic power more responsive 
to its wishes. This is precisely what public regulation in the USA, or partly public 
ownership in more socialistic European nations represents. Put in more dynamic terms, 
the welfare state represents a balance between two kinds of threats, irresponsible 
economic management is threatened with public control when it does not produce 
satisfactory results, whereas the extension of public control is limited by the potential
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costs of increasing an essentially unproductive public bureaucracy and diminishing
private incentives.’,29
At this point right wing’s welfare capitalism and left view supporters’ liberal 
welfare approach converge towards each other both in theory and practice. The concept 
of new left emerges as the need for social justice heightens while the principles of 
economic liberalism expands throughout the world.
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Chapter H I
STATE AND ECONOMY LINKAGES
By referring to their distinctive institutions one can conceptualize the terms state and 
economy, the state consists of the executive, legislature, judiciary, military and police 
forces while the economy consists of firms, corporations, banks, etc. Looking at the 
activities that take place in them: the state is oriented to the exercise of authority in 
society, and the economy is oriented to the production and consumption of scarce
resources.
“Every phenomenon exists only in relation to other phenomena, or, in other 
words, exists only in and through other phenomena... The economic and the political, 
although seemingly existing independently from each other, involve each other as 
moments of one process.” ^'According to this argument, diverse forms of social 
organizations, like the state and the economy (both having different sources of power), 
do not exist externally related where one dominates and / or determines the other, but as 
forms of existence of the relation which constitutes them. Since the economic 
organization and the state possess very different sources of power important questions 
arise: How can the state gain influence over the institutions that make up the economy?
And how can state authority be exercised over the production and consumption of scarce 
resources? Max Weber in his discussion of the nature of domination exercised by the 
state pointed out that there are two contrasting types of domination; i) domination by 
virtue of a group of interests (position of monopoly); ii) domination by virtue of 
authority. On the other hand, the power of economic organization is grounded in its 
domination of critical aspects of the production and allocation of scarce resources. “The 
organized private economy is a competitive, sometimes overtly conflictual, externality- 
creating realm of decision-making beyond the direct control of the state. From this 
perspective, economic policy in the context of liberal capitalist society tries to elicit a 
particular response from organized constellations of interests dominating the 
performance of various economic functions.”
3.1 The Role of the State
Prior to World War I, states were rather limited to roles given by Adam Smith as that of 
the night - watchman. However, World War I required economic mobilization and led to 
an expansion of the economic role of the state in production, labor mobilization and 
taxation. This role of the state continued after the war since there was need for social 
assistance due to high unemployment. There was also involvement in labor relations and 
a tendency towards greater emphasis on corporatist solutions. The growth of the state 
occurred with the concept of the welfare state which was loosely based on a number of 
theories developed in the interwar years. The welfare state represents a political and 
moral concept. From these, a new social partnership emerged between capital, labor, the 
state and the market. Among the three central consensus areas in the post-war years, one
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was the commitment by government to guarantee a minimum standard of living for the 
poor through the welfare state. The other two were: pragmatism in state intervention in 
industry and a macro-economic role for the state in coordinating individual behavior.'  ^
Thus the state economic interventionism of the inter-war years that largely focused upon 
international economic cooperation on the one hand created economic conflict and 
depression, while starting a tradition of statism which focused upon raising domestic 
welfare after World War ll. Hence, after the war governments chose to pursue 
expansionaiy and interventionist economic policies (which did not necessarily undermine 
aggregate economic performance). However, after the 1970s an ever more integrated and 
internationalized economy enabled the states to continue with such policies.^ For 
instance, the Thatcher Government in Britain since 1979 has pursued fundamentally 
different policies in major areas of economic policy from its post-war predecessors. 
Instead of expanding the economic borders of the state, it has attempted to curtail the role 
of the state in the economy. The intention behind this was to enhance the freedom of the 
individual and to encourage the growth of the enterprise culture!"
Today, some claim that global integration is weakening the modem state and its 
ability to coordinate economic policies. In Britain, a former chancellor of the exchequer 
put it this way: “The plain fact is that the nation state as it has existed for nearly two 
centuries is being undermined. The ability of national governments to decide their 
exchange rate, interest rate, trade flows, investment and output has been savagely 
crippled by market forces.”  ^ There are several leading political commentators agreeing 
with this view stating that the state’s powers over the price of money, tax rates, industrial
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policy, the rate of unemployment have been blown away. Although the trend seems to be 
going that way, to put it as “state’s powers have been blown away” is rather misleading. 
Changes in public spending provide the best overall measure for this issue. Among the 
Western economies, the gap between the lowest and highest shares of government has 
broadened since 1980 from 16 % points to 20. Since the 1980 the public spending ratio 
has increased, on average from 36 % of GDP to 40%. National governments not only 
retain wide discretion over the extent to which they control resources, but after 15 years 
of accelerating integration are tending to control more, not less. The fact remains that in 
all economic respects, global integration has left governments with all the economic 
powers they ever had.**
Consequently, a shift in the balance of public and private power has been taking 
place as governments increasingly intervene to modify the impact of domestic and 
international market forces on their industrial structures. At times the private sector is 
unable to respond effectively to changing patterns of competition or to develop industries 
which the state considers essential to support its domestic and foreign policies. In such a 
case, the state strengthens its existing national agencies or creates new ones to correct the 
structural weaknesses of the private sector. This is especially relevant since 1945 for 
many Western European states. For instance, the indicative planning in France, the 
expansion of the Instituto per la Riconstruzione Industríale (IRI) in Italy and the creation 
of the National Economic Development in Britain.^
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Thus national industrial policies involving state influence and intervention may be 
interpreted as an indication that politicians have the view that market forces alone are 
insufficient for meeting the broader needs of society, the interests of the state and even 
those of the individual firm. So, government policies may be necessary to meet increased 
foreign competition in home markets as well as to assist them in expanding their export
markets. 10
3.2 Economic Policy-making
According to Linda Weiss and J.M. Hobson in their book “States and Economic 
Development,” non-economic - especially political - institutions are vital to the 
maintenance and transformation of the modem market economy. They argue that the 
relative strength of states has been and continues to be one of the major mechanisms for 
determining the comparative industrial position for countries within the economy. More 
or less the same views are shared by Stephen Cohen and John Zysman. They point out 
that the wealth and power of the USA depends upon maintaining mastery and control of 
production. At this point policy sets the terms of the new competition.
Policy can help to upgrade a nation’s position in a substantial way, or it can 
handicap national producers and eventually may weaken production capability. “The one 
thing policy is least able to do is to have no impact on a nation’s competitive position.”" 
Today, each one of the large and developed world economies are heavily policy- 
impacted. The anxiety of the capitalist societies is that a government with a powerful role
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in industrial development and a bold policy initiative would lead to government 
entanglement in the daily affairs of the firms.
The fact that government almost always plays a role in economic development 
should not mean that an active intervention is the only role possible for the government. 
There are levels of policies which run from the most general to the most specific:
i) aggregate policies addressed at objectives that will affect all sectors,
ii) market-perfecting policies aimed at improving the economic infrastructure, i.e. 
policies to improve the working of telecommunications, transportation or financial 
systems.
iii) policies dealing with the problems of specific sectors, i.e. certain industrial policies. 
In fact these are the least politically acceptable policies: subsidizing, protecting or 
favoring specific sectors, industries or firms. "
In order to explain the state policy in a particular country one needs to ask two 
questions: first, who predominates in politics ( those seeking opportunity and profit in the 
market or those preferring to stay out of the market); and second, does the dominant 
group require government support or aid ( and to what degree the is state capable of 
providing help). The answer to the first question lies in the views of the politicians about 
the economy. First, they may seek insulation from the market, letting price signals 
control industry. Second, they may protect existing economic organization by limiting 
foreign access to its market and subsidizing declining sectors. Third, they may want to 
compensate the losers in the process of change, even bribing them not to interfere.
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Fourth, some may view the economy as a place for direct intervention, to promote or 
shape industrial change.'^
When we analyze these four views, the first three measures are indirect ones with 
more limited impact. The fourth is much more difficult to implement both technically 
and politically. In order to promote and shape industrial change the government must 
have its own view of where industry should be heading (its own interpretation of industry 
dynamics). It should mobilize and allocate resources in pursuit of the outcomes defined 
by its view and link domestic and foreign economic policy. So, a state strategy of 
purposive development requires a distinct set of capacities. In order to let the economy 
grow in a rapidly changing world, one must break each national economy into its 
industrial components and understand the adjustments they must make. ‘‘‘
Zysman groups the policy making into three categories; state-led, company-led 
and tripartite negotiated. In the first case, the state is an economic player. It seeks to 
select the terms on which sectors and companies confront the market. In the second 
model, the basic choices are made by individual firms by without outside interference. 
The state does not regulate or compensate any sector and it does not have a view of the 
long term development of the economy and of industry. The last model involves an 
explicit and continuing negotiation of the terms of industrial change - by the 
predominant social partners. Germany is an example of such a model where finance 
plays a role in resolving the particulars of corporate crisis with banks playing an almost 
parapublic role. On the other hand, France can readily be categorized as a state-led
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promotional type; and Britain represents a case of failure to make any particular choice 
about an approach to policy-making. Still the tradition of private and often public 
company autonomy from government and finance makes Britain typical of company-led 
adjustment, whereas the state’s effort to take the initiative is reminiscent of state-led.'^
Government policies can intensify the international competition in a way that it 
can affect a nation’s comparative advantage. Then trade conflicts, to some extent, 
become battles over which countries will have accelerated rates of development. The 
present problem we are dealing with is at its core a political problem. In the 1980s, the 
political problems of economic and specifically industrial policy-making have changed. 
The governments attempt to create and maintain comparative advantage by policies that 
promote public and private investment. The germane question is how should 
governments fit into the process of industrial change and therefore industrial policy­
making. The roles govermnents play in industrial affairs depend on the relationship of a 
number of elements like political coalition, administrative structure and the industrial 
tasks that confront the country.
“Businessmen exert a kind of political leverage because of their position as 
decision makers in the economy.”'^  It was the businessmen, not politicians, who 
launched the movement towards a single European market and a common currency in the 
mid-1980s which has transformed the EU. Since then, their voice has carried great 
weight (but the near unanimity of a few years ago has disappeared). The issues raised by 
the Maastricht Treaty are many and complex and they have divided Europe’s
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businessmen. They join lobbies against, as well as, for the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Doubts expressed by one leading Danish businessman may have helped 
influence voters in Denmark who narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a 
referendum. For instance, the head of a shipping and energy conglomerate in Denmark 
may have inadvertently influenced many Danish voters against Maastricht when he 
warned against a Community dominated by Germany, ‘a country with a tendency to 
dominate a little.’
The influence of financial systems on politics; the French system of intervention 
rests on it is state-dominated, credit-based financial system with administered prices. The 
financial system embodies so much discretion that the state bureaucrats are obliged to 
exercise it. The financial arrangements affect not only the form that policy takes - how 
the state achieves its purposes - but also significantly influence the character and the 
outcomes of political conflicts about the purposes of state intervention. In the British 
case, the financial system, proved an obstacle, in the 1960s, for the government that 
wanted to establish the interventionist policy to promote industrial redevelopment and 
adjustment. State bureaucrats had to go around the private financial system in order to 
use money grants as a means of industrial intervention. The financial system’s autonomy 
from the executive also influenced the nature of the government’s response to Britain’s 
industrial decline. The government had neither the instruments to reform capitalism nor a 
conception of how to manipulate the industrial economy. The lack of a state authority to 
exert leadership in industrial affairs shaped the political terms in which economic decline 
was confronted.'^ In the German case, the structure and direction of German industry
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required virtually no change during the boom as seen in France and Britain the financial 
systems are quite different. A government’s various policies for industry, if taken as a set, 
represent a political settlement among different social groups and sectors about the terms
of industrial change. 18
3.3 Policv-Makins in the European Union
Europe is a complicated and a highly diverse area. Even the geographical area where 
only Britain, France and Germany are considered varies from modem, science-oriented, 
world metropolitan regions, such as London and Paris to backward regions. By backward 
regions it is meant the areas where more than 40 % of the population drive their 
livelihoods from agriculture. Therefore, it is hard to identify clearly the influence of 
explicit policies. It may be possible to say that in Europe industrial policy can be helpful 
in compensating the harmful effects of deindustrialization, of which Sweden is 
successful example. However, it is not necessarily possible to conclude from this that a 
similar industrial policy would work in another part of Europe.''^
In Europe, there is also the problem of national industrial policies that may not be 
consistent with the European Union’s stated goals. In certain member states 
protectionism took the further form of growing public expenditure subsidies to national 
industries which could not otherwise compete.^ *^  These kinds of measures clash with the 
aims of the Community. Since the establishment of the European Economic Community, 
certain regulations and later more significant policies have been influential in 
transforming Europe’s certain industries. In recent years, the importance of non­
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agricultural spending is growing but it is still small in relative terms. With industry 
employing 35 % of the community’s active population and accounting for 40 % of the 
gross value-added of the EU’s economy, it might be expected to be at the very center of 
community policy concerns. Nevertheless, the increasingly interdependent nature of the 
international system has persuaded the West European States to transfer most of their 
policy-making responsibilities to a higher level in an attempt “to shape, to manage, to 
control, to take advantage of and to keep a pace with the modem world.
The events in Eastern Europe were largely unexpected, swift and potentially very 
far-reaching in their political and economic implications. The most important 
development concerning the Community’s move towards 1992 were the proposals for 
German unification. The plans for a monetary union between the two Germany had 
implications for both the European Monetary System and the future development of the 
Community. Despite all these changes, agreements and events the fundamental aims and 
operation of the main economic policies of the Community do remain the same as 
before. During the move towards an economic and monetary union, much of the 
disturbance has been caused by certain parts of the Delors Report published early in 
1989. Despite the great controversy surrounding the publication of this report, it was 
agreed at the Community Summit, Madrid, in June 1989, that the first stage of the 
European Monetary Union would begin, as proposed by the report on first of July 1990.
All these policy changes and the events in Eastern Europe had economic, political 
and even social effects for both the member and the non-member states. It is clear that
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the demands on the Community budget had grown; important increases had been made 
for social and regional spending. Though the main policy areas of the EU stays the same, 
certain ones are given a priority while some others lost importance.
The European Union’s main policy interests and responsibilities can be grouped 
under five headings:
i) establishing the Common Market,
ii) economic and financial policies,
iii) functional policies,
iv) sectoral policies,
v) external policies.
Industrial policy can be grouped under both functional and sectoral policies. Under 
functional policies, there exists the policies which have a clear functioning purpose and 
which are more specific in nature than the policies in other groups. From this perspective, 
industrial policy includes aspects of the regional and social policies, research and 
technological development policy and competition policy. Some EU policies are directed 
towards specific economic sectors. These are grouped under sectoral policies. For 
example, for fishing there is the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) agreed in 1983. In steel 
industry, through sectoral law the Community authorities have potentially greater powers 
of intervention than in any other sector apart from agriculture and fishing. Thus, under 
industrial policy there are specific policies for some expanding and some contracting 
sectors.So, a fully developed and coherent industrial policy does not exist. There are a
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large number of policies (more like regulations rather than well-developed coherent 
policies) which affect industry.
The policy tools of the EU are again a combination of regulations, co-ordination 
and programmes. However, in recent years these tools have sometimes appeared to be 
operating in opposition to each other. Especially, the aid programme has come to the 
rescue of industries that industrial and competition policies are attempting to restructure 
or contract.“^  Some of the policy instruments of the Union are as follows:
i) Exchange of economic and technical information is of great value to those committed 
to decisions on the governmental or the private level. The commission is active in that 
respect by furthering information as well as scientific and technical documentation.
ii) Financial intervention is preferred by governments as an instrument to deal with 
production structures, in the form of either direct support or tax relief However, EU’s 
means for aid have so far been limited and mostly served as a complement to national 
programmes.
iii) Technical standards and norms count in many member states as effective protection 
against competition. On the other hand, such norms can stimulate efforts towards certain 
social achievements, such as limiting pollution and protection of consumers. The EU has 
steadily tries to harmonize such norms on the European level.
iv) Government procurement is frequently used in all countries to stimulate the 
development of certain production strains on the national level. In sectors of advanced 
technology, national suppliers tend to receive preferential treatment. The Union policy 
concerning this has got a new impetus with the 1992 Programme.
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v) Trade Policy can also be used as a tool for industrial policy. The preamble to the 
European Economic Community Treaty explicitly states the principle of open-door- 
policy towards other countries But still it maintains significant tariffs on key imports. 
Although the national quotas are stopped by the Maastricht Treaty, this made the 
European Union level agreements even more important. A controversial side of trade 
policy has been the anti-dumping regulations. The main target of anti-dumping 
procedures are Asian electronics companies. Targeting Korean and Japanese firms, the 
Community has used an anti-circumvention policy. Its purpose was to ensure that firms 
do not circumvent dmnping rulings by building an assembly plant in the EU. Another 
part of this policy rules of origin is to determine exactly where a product is made. EU has 
made some protectionist rules concerning especially complex products like autos, 
televisions or computers. '^*
The European Union treaties are generally seen as key determinants of policy­
making and a platform to practice above tools. Before going into the definitions of 
industry and industrial policy in Europe, a historical evolution of the industrial policy 
through the EU treaties will be examined: the Treaty of Paris of 1951 gave the 
Commission numerous statutory powers with respect to the steel industry when it created 
the European Coal and Steel Community. The Commission is responsible for 
periodically defining modernization objectives, orienting production and increasing 
production capacities, Tudama investment programmes, authorizing industrial 
concentrating and granting investment loans. The Treaty of Paris also empowers the 
Commission to declare a crisis situation that enables it to regulate production and limit
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imports from non-member countries. The increasing influencing of the state in industry 
has been a feature of post-war European development. The Treaty of Rome signed soon 
after World War II covers aspects like: state aid, dominant firms, cartels, the right of 
establishment, the free movement of capital and labour, dumping and the creation of the 
common market itself However, these only cover a part of what is meant by the policy. 
Moreover, the treaty is not that comprehensive in the areas as well. The Commission, in 
this first statement on industrial policy, largely stressed the ‘Community aspects’ of such 
a policy.‘  ^ “The new framework for industrial activity is not that of the community it is 
for the community to review its industrial structures and to co-ordinate the operations of 
member states or even to adopt the measures required itself
The necessity of creating an industrial policy at the European level was clearly 
asserted by the Commission in 1970. Before then, it was only assumed to be catalysed 
through the creation of a common market. However, the decline of industries in 
prosperous areas emphasized the need for structural and regional industrial policy. 
Memorandum on Industrial Policy in the Community in March 1970, was signed to 
underline the importance of the structural side of industrial policy and promote action in 
this area. This Memorandum, entitled The Industrial Policy of the Community had the 
objective, “to allow industry to derive the maximum advantages from the existence and 
size of the Common Market.”^^  This contained six main headings:
i) the removal of remaining barriers to the creation of a single market,
ii) the harmonization of company law and taxation and the creation of a Community 
capital market.
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iii) the reorganization of industry to adopt it to the needs of the Common Market,
iv) the promotion of technology,
v) the social and regional aspects of industrial development,
vi) the extension of Community Solidarity in economic relations with third parties, by the 
way of common commercial policy.^* However, the 1970 Memorandum achieved not 
much progress and three years later Commission submitted another programme, this time 
in order to focus attention on a particular aspect of industrial policy. The Action 
programme in the field of technological and industrial policy of May 1973 centered on 
nine areas :
i. abolition of technical barriers to trade,
ii. liberalization of public contracts,
iii. abolition of fiscal barriers to coperation between firms,
iv. abolition of legal barriers to coperation,
V. Community promotion of advanced technology undertakings,
vi. restructuring and modernization of certain industrial sectors,
vii. concentration and competition,
viii. exports and credit insurance,
ix. raw material supplies - particularly non-ferrous.
Commission had sent a short paper to European Council in March 1983, entitled 
Community Industrial Strateg. In this paper. Commission tries to dispel the uncertainties 
arising from what the community’s industrial policy aims are. The Paper starts with two 
preliminary points; First, even in the growth sectors of industry the European
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performance is much less favorable to either Japanese and American competitors. 
Second, this continuing decline of industry increases the risk of national action. The 
Commission makes clear that the main question should be how to achieve a genuine 
contribution to the process of positive adjustment of community industry. Therefore, the 
purpose of Community strategy should be to provide practical answers to this question. 
The Paper also states that industrial measures are primarily planned and carried-out 
nationally instead of within a Community context. “The industrial strategy is directed to: 
i) discouraging individual or sectoral measures not integrated into a macro-economic 
framework; and ii) endorsing measures, the failure to take which would jeopardize a
sector’s development. „29
The White Paper (1985) was assertive about the need for a rigorous Community 
Policy on the type of anti-competitive practice represented by state aid to industry. There 
are some tendencies, although less now but particularly strong during the signing of 
White Paper and following it (1985-1990) to spend large amounts of public funds on 
state aids to uncompetitive industries. Regardless of such efforts, a broad strategy 
concerning all aspects of industrial policy had failed. This failure according to some 
critics occurred as a result of “lack of interested parties in the member states and 
differences in the economic philosophies of member governments.” *^ Only after the 
emergence of the Single European Act (SEA) a coherent industrial policy came into
existence.
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3.4 Public vs. Private Sector
Whatever the reasons that have led Western European governments to increase their 
involvement in their domestic economies, the result has been a gradual but significant 
modification in the relationship of the state to the private sector. On one hand, there is 
the structural soundness and competitiveness of industry and the process regulating 
intrasectoral and intersectoral competition that are concerns of all groups; and on the 
other hand, there is the wider impact of industrial decision making such as regarding the 
patterns of employment, income distribution, regional development and conditions of 
work that may be ignored by the managers of firms. “Consequently, it is of great 
importance whether the state in asserting its powers to influence industry induces firms 
to relate production-oriented decisions to these broader issues”.^  ^ Outright government 
ownership of industry is fairly extensive in Western European countries especially when 
compared to the USA. In Western Europe, telecommunications, electricity, railroads and 
airlines are almost completely government owned, and government ownership is 
substantial in the gas, oil, coal, steel, shipuilding, and auto industries (See Table: 1).
The increased interdependence of business and government has meant that both in 
France and Britain a system of de facto power sharing has developed vrithin an 
institutionalized system of reciprocal influence. The real bargaining goes on among the 
actual holders of bureaucratic and managerial power. The establishment of the European 
Union has introduced an additional dimension into this domestic balance. The EU has 
extended the geographic market for the private sectors of its fifteen member states 
without including the expansion of the powers of national authorities. Within these
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‘mixed economies’ it is not always clear just how powerful the state is. However, there is 
a general assumption that such relations almost always work to the advantage of the
private sector. 33
Table: 1 Percentage of public and private ownership o f certain sectors in 
________________________ selected countries
Post Telecom Electricity Gas Oiloutput Coal Rail Airlines Autos
Austria • • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Belgium • • 0 0 n.a. © 0 0 © 0 ©
Britain • • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fronce • • • 0 n.a. 0 0 0 0 0 ©
Germany • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 © 0
Italy • • 0 0 n.a. na.. 0 0 0 0 0
Holland • • 0 0 n.a. n.a. 0 0 © 0 ©
Sweden • • 0 0 n.a. n.a. 0 0 © 0 0
United
States • © 0 © © © 0 © © © ©
Privately owned: Publicly owned;
all or nearly all 0 all or nearly all 0  75 % 0  50 % 3  25 % 0
n.a. - Not applicable or negligible production.
Source: E. Rayack, Not So Free to Choose:. (New York; Praeger, 1987), 82.
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The structural argument suggests that the form of policy-making affects the 
purposes pursued: the structure affects not only the outcome but also the goals 
themselves. “...What is attempted and achieved is affected by how it must be done.” '^^  
The structure of the national financial system affects the capacity of the national political 
executive to intervene in the industrial economy. Since the financial system is a 
constraint on action and an influence on the power of relations in the economy it is an 
element shaping the industrial and economic relations.
3.5 State Aids and Subsidies
State aids refer to any state measure favoring certain actions or the production of certain 
goods. However, there is also a broader meaning attached to state aids. This argument 
puts the emphasis of state aids, “on ends rather than means and on effect rather than
form.’,35
To bring the states back into the industrial and financial systems has been 
particularly necessary after the outbreak of World War II. In the decades before the 
1930s, a rather liberal order had existed. When capital controls had been used, they were 
practised in a limited and temporary manner. The aim of the states to employ such 
measures was to prevent imfriendly states from borrowing in domestic capital markets. 
However, in 1931 by the collapse of international financial system and the outbreak of 
the World War II, this liberal regime ended. States started to form increasingly 
comprehensive systems of capital controls. Soon enough these controls came to be 
regarded as a permanent feature of state economic policies. This new interventionism
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was confirmed by the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. The Agreement gave countries 
the explicit right to use financial controls. Thus, throughout the early postwar years, 
almost all the industrialist countries employed extensive financial controls.^^’
State aids and subsidies occupy a dominant role in the economy and also 
determine to a large extent the performance of the private entreprises. Such aids have an 
impact upon the situation and orientation of private sector initiatives and strategies. 
Before any decisions are made, the availability of subsidies, aids or incentives are 
examined by the businessmen. The formation of such policies have the power to form or 
distort change and innovation. State aid policy is an influential public policy. Within the 
economic environment, it forms, like all the other public policies, “an institutional and 
social fi'amework where individual initiatives and expectations are replaced by
5?37governmental actions and reactions.”
The concept of the state as market place player ( as giving out aid and subsidies) 
is quite different from the concept of public ownership. A selective allocation of capital 
is necessary for the state to enter continuously into the industrial life of private 
companies. This way it can influence their strategies either as a rival or as a partner. 
Zysman gives two reasons why a credit allocation is an effective instrument of the state. 
First, it is critical in industrial policy because specific business decisions are hard to 
control or influence. Second, credit allocation is a universal tool. It eliminates the need to 
find specific authority to influence specific decisions. On the other hand, for example, 
taxation is not as flexible as credit allocation. Taxes can be used to target categories of
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action but they are difficult to manipulate toward specific industrial ends. Only 
government can provide funds to the sectors it wants to support.^* Countries can protect 
their favored firms by offering them generous subsidies.
This pressure on governments to compensate by stepping in with larger subsidies 
will eventually increase. Especially as the EU’s trade barriers fall, the relative 
importance of subsidies becomes greater. The prospect of large subsidies is important 
since these expenditures already occupy a large portion in the budgets of several 
European countries. The national budget share of the subsidies ranges from 4 % in 
France to 11 -12 % in Ireland, Norway and Sweden ( in the USA this percentage is I and 
in Japan it is 2 %). Some European industry observers had proposed that industrial 
subsidies should be temporarily increased after 1992 in order to ease the costs of the 
transition. However, temporary aid frequently becomes permanent. If one country uses 
subsidies to try to expand its market share it may trigger an expansive war. In the case of 
the European Union, if the full benefits of a single market are to be achieved, the 
removal of trade barriers would have to accompanied by rules controlling the use of
subsidies. 39
There is an academic opinion which provides justifications for selective 
government intervention in the economy according to James Meade , who was awarded 
the Nobel prize for economics in 1978,
“the intelligent radical will support the restoration and the 
development of the free market mechanism whenever it is possible
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to ensure competitive conditions [because] the great virtue of the 
competitive marketmechanism is that on the foundation of this 
market mechanism theremust be built a superstructure of 
governmental interventions and controls.
The main question that divides contemporary economists is where the free 
market should end and the governmental capital controls should begin. This question 
depends on whether one supports the free market structures to generate enough 
competitive forces to guarantee an efficient liberal market, or not. It is also dependent on 
some fundamental political attitudes. A declining industry might turn to government for 
protection or one on the rise might seek government support However, a mature and a 
profitable sector with stable markets and a competitive place might not require 
government intervention at all."*' The middle road position is that the market can cope 
with marginal structural change. Therefore it only needs help when it faces a major 
structural adjustment. However, the more interventionist argument, particularly presented 
by D. Hodgson, in the National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, asserted that, 
“government has an important part to play in helping industry achieve a better overall 
performance... either by direct (nationalization) or by indirect means (subsidies.
incentives).’,42
3,6 European Union Policy on State Aids
The founders of the European Communities established a strict control over the national 
state aids and all subsidies. This was based on the principle that states may distort
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competition between firms in different member countries. Therefore, an even more 
profound Community State aid policy is required. An effective community control of 
subsidies Avill also increase the long term efficiency of community industry. Commission 
of the European Union describes the subsidies as:
“All forms of specific transfers from the government sector 
which directly or indirectly benefit enterprises, for which the 
government receives no equivalent compensation in return and 
which are granted with the purpose of changing market
outcome. «43
And the State Aids as follows; “The particular subset of all subsidies which are 
subject to Community policy is referred to as ‘State Aid’. State aids are basically those 
subsidies which distort intra-Community competition. For the EU, the main purpose is 
to make sure that state aid really produces economic transitions. EEC Treaty did not 
abolish all state aid and subsidies. Its aim was to secure undistorted competition while 
leaving room for aids in specific areas. Though, in the First Report on Competition 
Policy, the Commission argued that a state aid generally implies a conflict of interests 
between the involved countries.
Today, the Commission has a clear intention to reduce such aids or even to stop 
them altogether in the near future. Especially considering the politics involved, there is a 
remarkable display of Commission power and initiative. However, there is a view that 
the industrial policy is not able to protect the core European Industries from market 
forces. Some European govenments (France and Italy in particular) support the argument
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that some industrial sectors are strategic, ie. autos, electronics, aerospace, computers, 
semiconductors, advanced materials and defense industries. They argue that such 
strategic assets are worthy of protection.Therefore, the aid levels show significant 
differences among the individual member states.
A survey done by the Commission between 1986 - 1988 identified a total of ECU 
82 billion in annual spending for national state aids in the member states. This amounts 
to 2.2 % of Community GDP. Among the member states, Denmark’s, United Kingdom’s, 
and Germany’s spent 1 % of their GDP. The other members spending amounted to 3 % 
and more. From these surveys it can be observed that state aids are heavily concentrated 
on three sectors (nearly 60 % go to these sectors): transport (30 %), coal indusrty (16%), 
agriculture and fisheries (13 %). Between the 1988 - 1990 period the averages stayed 
almost the same and the remaining 40% of total aid went to manufacturing (steel and 
shipbuilding and cars, electronics, aviation, etc.). The lowest aid to industry is given in 
decreasing order, in Germany, Denmark and United Kingdom.“*^ The aid level in industry 
is declining over the whole period and particularly since 1988.
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Table: 2 Aids to manufacturing by objective or sector, 1986-88, as
% of GDP
B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK EUR 12
Horizontal objs. 0,59 0,23 0,27 1,04 0,14 0,34■ 0,73 0,46' 0,28 0,45 0,92 0,20 0,33
Innovation/R&E 0,07 0,1 3 0,13 0,15 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,04  ^ 0,13 0,02; 0,06  ^ 0,09
SMEs 0,21 o,oc 0,06 0,09 0,01 0,04 0,09 0,13 0,13 0,20 0,03 0,05 0,08
Trade/export OJl 0,05 0,01 0,79 0,01 0,19 0,57 0,10 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,05 0,09
General invest. 0,11 0 0,01 0 0,04 0,04 0 0,04 0,09 0,07 0,81 0,03 0,04
Other objectives 0,09 0,04 0,05 0 0,02 0,01 0 0,12 0 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,04
Particular sectors 0,10 0,07 0,06 0,50 0,97 0,34 0,21 0,24 0 0,04 0,44 0,19 0,24
Steel 0 0 0,01 0 0,35 0,00 0 0,05 0 0 0,06 0,00 0,04
Shipbuilding 0,03 0,07 0,02 0 0,04 0,06 (3 0,03 0 0,02 0,07 0,07 0,04
Other sectors 0,08 0 0,03 0,50 0,59 0,27 0,21 0,15 0 0,02 0,31 0,12 0,16
Regional aid 0,08 0,02 0,46 0,98 0,03 0,06 0,61 0,75 0,36 0,09 -0,06 0,19 0,32
Least fav. Rgns. 0 0 0 0,98 n.a. 0,02 0,61 I0,65 0 0 0,06 0,04 0,14^
Other regions 0,18 0,02 0,46 (3 n.a. 0,04 0 0,10 0,36 0,09 10 0,15 0,18
Total 0,9 0,3 0,8 2,5 L2 0,7 L6 L5 0,7 0,6 L4 0,6 0,9
* Including all Spanish regional aid
Source: Commission of the Euronean Communities, Third Survey on State Aids.^  Brussels, 199 3 , 13,
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Table: 3 Aids to manufacturing by objective or sector, 1986-88, as % of
gross value-added in manufacturing.
B DK D GR j L NL P UK EUR 12
HarizorUal objectives
Innovation/R&D
SMEs
Trade/export 
General investment 
Other objectives 
Particular sectors 
Steel
Shipbuilding 
Other sectors 
Regional aid
2,91 1,35 0,93 6,45 0,61 1,70 2,89 1,99 1,08 2,47 3,35 0,88 1,43
0,37 0,75 0,46 0,92 0,27 0,32 0,28 0,32 0,14 0,72 0,09 0,25 0,38 
1,05 0,02 0,22 0,59 0,06 0,19 0,36 0,58 0,50 1,09 0,12 0,22 0,32
0,54 0,32 0,05 4,95 0,05 0,92 2,24 0,42 0,07 0,05 0,09 0,23 0,37
0,52 0 0,02 0 0,16 0,22 0 0,18 0,36 0,40 2,94 0,15 0,17
0,43 0,26 0,19 0 0,07 0,05 0 0,49 0 0,21 0,11 0,03 0,19
0,51 0,39 0,19 3,11 4,20 1,68 0,84 1,04 0 0,20 1,61 0,87 1,04
0 0 0,02 0 1,50 0,01 0 0,23 0 0 0,24 0,01 0,16
0,13 0,38 0,06 0 0,17 0,31 0 0,15 0 0,09 0,27 0,33 0,18
0,38 0,01 0,01 0,11 3,11 2,53 0 84 0.66 0 0,11 1,11 0,53 0,70
0,88 0,11 0,59 6,10 0,11 0,28 2,38 3,21 1,37 0,47 0,21 0,83 1,37
Least favoured regions 0 0 0 6,10 n.a. 0,10 2,38 2,78 0 0 0,21 0,18 0,60^
Other regions________0,88 0,11 1,59 0 n.a. 0,18 0 0,43 1,37 0,47 0 0,65 0,76
Total 4,3 1,9 2,7 15,7 4,9 3.7 6,1 6.2 2,5 3,2 5,2 2,6 3.8
Manufacturing GVA estimated.
Including all Spanish regional aid. Source: Commission of EC , Third Survey on State .Aids. Bnissels,1993, 31 .
Despite an overall reduction of aid to industry at the Community level which is a 
result of reductions in the majority of member states, significant differences between the 
individual countries remain. A comparison of the four big economies shows that “in Italy 
aid in per cent of value added is three times higher than in the United Kingdom, more 
than two times higher than in Germany and more the one and a half times higher than in
France”.''^  Following an enormous increase in state aid in the early 1980s the
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Commission sent a communication to member states announcing that “it would require 
them to refund any aid granted without prior notification of the Commission or a prior 
ruling by the Commission on the aid’s compatibility with Article 92.”'^ *
It seems that the volume of aid in the Community presents a downward tendency 
over the years. However, the expenditure of Italy, Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom increased from 75 per cent of the annual average of aid to industry to 79 per 
cent in the period 1986 - 1990. This rise of industry support in the four largest member 
states has some negative effects within the community."*  ^ By subsidizing companies in 
their own countries, national governments distorted competition throughout the whole 
Community and put nonsubsidized companies at an obvious disadvantage. Therefore, a 
strict control of state aid became vital for the success of the the single market.
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Chapter IV
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EUROPE
4AA Historical Look at Capitalism and Industrialization in Europe.
Several authors including Immanuel Wallerstein stressed the importance of the nature of 
the European state system in the rise of capitalism. The principal aspect of European 
state system was the more or less equal distribution of power. This balance of power 
between sovereign states had immediate consequences for economic development. The 
relative stability of territorial boundaries also played an important role in the rise of 
European capitalism. Different states of Europe underwent different paths towards 
capitalism. In the post -1650 period, each of these different routes eventually converged 
into the capitalist economy. Weiss and Hobson summarized the European economy 
formation in three categories: i) the militarized feudal; ii) the militarized agrarian; and 
iii) the militarized-capitalist. An example to the first path could be Prussia and Russia. 
Tsarist strategies in relation to peasant property were quite different than in the other 
European states. France is an example for the militarized-agrarian way of economic 
development. Military costs rapidly rose in the seventeenth century and in order to cope 
with this, France rearranged the feudal system of production relations. This strategy 
stimulated a system of rural production based on the peasant commune in order to 
maximize fiscal military accumulation. Britain can be categorized under the third route, 
since it had a different way of solving the fiscal dilemma of the 17th century. The state 
did not rely on direct land taxes (as in France). The existence of trade, in Britain, avoided
a land-based tax that would harm the peasantry'. Instead, indirect taxes were used. Other 
two important ingredients were a strong penetrative state power and a commercialized 
economy.' State policies on merchantilism transformed political space in the 17th and 
18th centuries. As Schmoller put it, “this is the true conception of merchantilism; it is in 
fact a great policy of national construction; state- making and national economy making 
at the same time...”^
Merchantilism brought with itself the tariffs which were probably the first 
revenue-producing taxes on imported goods. Above all, merchantilism was pursued by 
states in order to increase their penetrative military and economic powers. States faced 
several choices when they pursued revenue. Britain, for example, led the way towards a 
financial revolution in order to cope with high military costs. The Bank of England was 
created in 1694 in order to confirm this system. Also firearms had a special impact on 
economic development. They initiated the use of iron and had many technological spin 
offs for economic development.They also generated a constant demand for iron and other 
steel products. Therefore, it required cheap and efficient methods of production. Another 
area of industry that war greatly stimulated was cotton manufacturing. This is especially 
relevant for the British case and in its industrialization. Governments created their own 
iron foundries, textile and armaments factories. No doubt that these public firms had a 
demonstrative effect on the private sector.^
Warfare in the 18th and 19th centuries stimulated states to introduce industrial 
policies. Therefore, industrialization was itself related to military pressures and was
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implemented by states as their political structures emerged. By the 18th and 19th 
centuries in Europe, states intervened through market-promoting strategies and 
unplanned market influence. Largely military pressures of the time shaped the states’ 
strategies toward their economic bases. As a result, a relationship between the state and 
the capitalist class was established. The conditions for capitalism were developed and 
state gathered fiscal-military revenues. British industrialization for an instance, involved 
property rights, a national and legal and a powerful enclosure policy. The rise of national 
economies in Europe mostly emerged as a unintended consequence of states’ political 
decisions. For example, in Prussia Zollverein was used to expand its political power to 
the rest of Germany. The main purpose of Zollverein or customs union was to provide 
indirect tax revenues to the member states.
During the 19th century, European industrialization tended to be mainly a 
regional phenomenon and the transformation of whole national economies remained less 
complete than in Britain. Even Belgium, the smallest of the industrial countries, had its 
backward agrarian region. Germany, the outstanding industrial success among the great 
powers, still retained a large peasant sector and some of the features of a dual economy 
which were established earlier. Italy was disadvantaged by lack of natural resources and 
the failure of capitalism to carry through a transformation of the agrarian sector. By 
comparison with the rest of the world, however, Europe had the most advanced capitalist 
economy. Especially between the world wars, Europe as a whole appeared to be aging 
and in decline compared with the US, Japan and Russia. New forms of industrial 
technology, business methods and consumption patters, as well as, economic and
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industrial policies (developed or realized their full potential outside Europe), contributed 
after 1945 to make possible a renewed process of rapid growth.'* Today, the political task 
a country confronts in trying to sustain growth has changed. While a generation ago it 
was agriculture that had to be moved and modernized, today such sectors as textiles and 
steel must be displaced or transformed. This may prove to be more difficult than simply 
modernizing agriculture. First, changes in industrial structure represent a challenge to the 
patterns of ownership which was avoided in the process of modernizing agriculture. 
Second, industrial workers are more highly organized and their specific actions and 
strategies will affect the organization of production. Third, the gap between returns from 
any two sectors is likely to be less than the gap between agriculture and industry a 
generation ago in the developed nations.^
All industrialization processes had certain common features. The difficult point is 
to define the necessary social and cultural conditions for industrialization to succeed. For 
example, an institutional framework and legal system had to be created to suit the needs 
of a complex industrial society. European society, with its antecedents in the classical 
world was fortunate that it both had the required legal system and the private ownership 
geared to the needs of the market. Within Europe, the fundamental conditions for 
industrialism had been worked out as a result of expanding trade and the growth of a 
market-oriented economy over a span of many centuries. On the European continent, as 
each country felt the impact of industrialization what might be called its national 
economic features began to take form. Considering this aspect a considerable weight has
to be given to national structures and traditions. Below are the historical industrialization 
processes of the three main European countries; Britain, France and Germany.
4.1.0, Britain:
Britain had undergone certain structural transformations which were necessary for its 
industrialization. Therefore, one could not sum up a single cause for the industrial 
revolution in Britain. It was an extremely broad and complex process composed of 
inseparable factors. A principle theme of the industrial revolution was the way industrial 
capital took command of production. This was especially the case in textile industries. It 
was more like a chain reaction where the growth of the market encouraged greater 
investment in production and this revealed the shortcomings of the existing industrial 
organizations. The growth of industry in 18th century Britain was not only in textiles but 
also for everyday household articles, farm implements, leather goods, paper and 
processed food and drink. “The industrial revolution was launched in an economy which 
was already being transformed with s)miptoms of growth making it different already from 
the continental economies.”  ^ The system of banking was more advanced and geared 
towards business needs than on the continent. This, alone, shows the more commercial, 
market-oriented nature of the economy.
Railway system in Britain made a direct impact on the continent. It had a 
revolutionary effect for heavy industry and led to the rapid adaptation of techniques of 
iron-making, coal-mining and engineering. A difference between Britain and the 
European Continent was industry tended to be organized in many competitive self-
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financed family firms in Britain while on the continent many of the firms were of large 
scale from an early stage. These enterprises looked to outside sources of finance and 
sought to limit the effectiveness of competition. On the other hand, according to Tom 
Kemp such differences should not be exaggerated. “In some ways industrialization 
followed a common path in all the European countries.”  ^ In general, France showed 
features closer to the British model than did Germany. Beginning with the Anglo-French 
Treaty of Commerce of 1860, all the European countries were insistent on a 
liberalization of trade relations.
However, European industry was still vulnerable to competition from Britain. 
Thus, the protectionism reaction occurred and industry became increasingly more 
dependent upon government; but each government saw its responsibility differently. 
Britain remained a free trade country because it gained more from it than being 
protectionist. The latecomer-industries of the continent demanded protection and 
obtained it. So, compared with other states, protectionism in Britain was mild, while 
colonial development existed.*^
Above all, industrialization in Britain was not part of a preconceived plan or 
programme. It resulted from the operations of many competing business firms 
spontaneously pursuing their self-interest. Also, the institutional setting and the business 
climate was extremely favourable to the full and free operations of market forces.
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4,Lb, France:
In France a good deal of the stimulu;; !or industrialization came from the state. The state 
introduced large scale organisations and new methods of production. It also provided 
various forms of financial support and other incentives as part of a traditional policy of 
active intervention in industry. Moreover, (ear of British competition generated a 
protectionist reaction."  ^ In France much industrial production was geared to satisfy the 
extravagant tastes of the rich consumers. I he emphasis was on quality not low cost 
production and on skilled craftmanship rather tl:an on machine technology. In France, 
industrialization proceeded in a way charaGlenstically different from the one in Britain. 
“Large scale investment in modern plant for ma ;; production remained exceptional and 
there were few big industrial concemrations” ''^  A modem and dynamic sector was 
introduced alongside the traditional agrarian sector. Up to 1840s, France was poorly 
endowed with banks and there was a pressing shortage of money and credit. The 
development of banking was slow since there was no need for it for a long time. Industry 
started to play a leading role by a process of accretion. Railway building speeded up the 
process encouraging the heavy industry. Until, the rapid industrialization started in 
Germany, France remained the leading industrial country on the continent.*’
In the last quarter of the 19th century, and in the years till 1914, France began a 
more rapid transformation towards a modem industrial country. During this period great 
developments occurred in banking and financial institutions. These institutions also 
started to participate in both domestic industrial investment and in foreign lending. The
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iron and steel industry was established on modem lines and big new plants were built, for 
example, Lorraine orefield. Mainly, French industry retained its place in the quality and 
luxury-fields. On the other hand, it failed to exploit the growing market opportunities in 
other countries, thus staying behind Britain and Germany. Within the country, there was 
monetary stability and the range of government activities remained small, financial 
policy was extremely orthodox and there was not even a progressive income tax. “The 
paradox of French economic development in the period between 1789 and 1914 was 
primarily that all the potentialities for growth were not realized.” '^
4A,c. Germany:
The conditions in which Germany’s industrialization took place formulated a distinctive 
capitalism in that country. The distinctive feature of this capitalism was based on a short 
concentration of economic power in the advanced industries, a close association between 
the banks and the industry; and the combination of a traditional institutional framework 
with the most developed forms of capitalism. Although Germany once played a 
relatively important part in the economic development of Europe, compared with the 
North-West Europe it was still backwards.
During the time of Frederick the Great mercantilist practices were established. 
Industry and trade were subject to wide bureaucratic direction and control. There was a 
tradition of state intervention in the economy. The policies of Fredrick involved heavy 
taxation, high protective duties and the preservation of serfdom which were hardly 
favorable to industrialization. Only with the construction of the railways, the industrial
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transformation of Germany began in 1840. As in all of Europe, industrialization in 
Germany was an uneven process. It had an archaic political framework and the society 
was still dominated by an agrarian upper class, while a rapidly growing and advanced 
industiy was emerging. Initially, part of the capital for the expanding sectors came from 
abroad. New firms were organized from the beginning as joint stock companies. Banks 
also participated in these firms since only the banks could find large amounts of money 
required for these industries. Bankers, especially in the Rhineland, which was the most 
advanced economic area played an active role in these firms. In the 1860s, new Joint 
stock banks were founded that invested in industry. These banks dealt in industrial shares 
and provided long term capital and credit to industry. Without the efforts of these banks 
it would have been impossible to raise enough capital for the building of railways and the 
growth of industiy. Therefore, in Germany, industrial revolution was possible with the 
participation of banks and heavy industries. “A close tie-up between financial 
institutions and industry thus existed from the start of German industrialization.”'^
The basis of industrialization came with investments in coal-mining and the 
metallurgical industries. German industrialism from the beginning, had a form of its 
own which was the product of technical and financial conditions of the time. From an 
economic point of view German industrialization may be regarded as a great success. In a 
relatively short time, the country acquired a highly concentrated and technologically 
advanced industrial sector. At the end of the nineteenth century, industrial policy in 
Germany was still administered in a tradition of state paternalism. However, there were 
serious divisions of opinion about whether the state should intervene “to preserve as
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much as possible of the old social forms or should accept Germany’s commitment to 
industrialism.”'^  Starting from the 1880s the economic balance swung in favor of 
industry. Thus, within this framework German industrial capitalism carried forward and 
developed.
“The leading role played by heavy industry and the need, in the 
absence of already existing accumulations available for 
investment, to resort at an early stage to the joint stock company 
and bank lending produced a highly concentrated industrial
„15Structure.
Therefore, among the European countries, only in Germany there was a close 
interrelationship between industrial firms and banking institutions.
4.2 Europe After the World War II
The two World Wars greatly affected the European states. During the Second World War 
II, Britain vastly expanded the regulatory powers of the state. By the end of the war in 
1945, it needed to rebuild its industrial capacity but was so heavily in dept that only a 
large USA loan and the Marshall Plan saved the country from total economic breakdown. 
This was the case in the other two main nations on the continent as well: France and 
Germany. Their total collapse was only avoided by heavy USA loans and the Marshall 
Plan. The major challenge in the post-war era was to rebuild and revive industrial 
production. Britain pursued this kind of a policy in order to recapture a share of world 
export markets. “There was a strong demand by the British electorate that government 
intervene in economic life on a permanent basis to ensure hoped-for prosperity.” '^ ’ In
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1944, all three major political parties, then members of the wartime coalition 
government, agreed to guarantee that any future government would undertake to manage 
the economy. The goals would be a high and rising standard of living, full employment, a 
sound currency, a low rate of inflation and rapid economic development.
French planning after the war as Shonfield (1967) states: “ the characteristic 
attitude in large-scale economic management, which had made itself increasingly felt 
during the post-war period, is the pursuit of intellectual coherence.” '*^ French planning’s 
main indication is its long-term national vision. According to French statesmen economic 
planning is the most characteristic expression of the new capitalism. In this field of 
economic planning France can be seen as the innovator. This involved a consistent and 
coherent plan that encouraged a common view about the future to which firms would 
respond with bold investment plans “nudged, if necessaiy, by government tax and credit 
policies.”''^  The Monnet Plan formed the basis for such a planning. This was formulated 
at the end of 1945 to persuade the USA government that the French were serious about 
modernization in order to justify a loan. During this time, the lack of an industrial policy 
was generally regarded as a weakness of French planning.
German co-determinism, the right of workers to help direct firms they work in, 
was a major preoccupation of German trade unions in the years after the war. At first, 
they regarded it as a prerequisite for the socialization of large-scale heavy industry. Later, 
when the German economy was firmly steered towards a reconstructed capitalism it was 
seen as an alternative to assuring big business not to play the political role it had in the
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1930s. Today, Germany ranks among the most advanced countries in high-technology 
manufacturing activities. Growth and decline trends often paraded the ups and downs of 
manufacturing, unlike the experiences in the United Kingdom. The relative share of 
Germany’s service sector employment ranked among the lowest of the industrial nations. 
France is still a more highly centralized and administered economy than Germany or 
Britain. Service sector growth has not offset the loss of industrial output or employment. 
In fact, they have done better. The makers of public sector industrial policies sought to 
increase industrialization in the poorer regions. This proved moderately succesfull. '^^
After twenty-three years of unbroken conservative rule in France, the socialists 
came into power in 1981. When he came to power, Mitterand completed the 
nationalization of the banking industry and brought several other industrial sectors under 
government control. This raised the state-controlled share of the economy from twelve to 
seventeen percent.^' The core of Mitterand’s industrial policy was a major extention of 
the public sector. State ownership was concentrated in large enterprises. The most 
important was the public ownership in competitive sectors of manufacturing . The 
Interim Plan for 1982-1983 called for the expanded state sector to increase research.
development and innovation. 22
During the slowdown years, improving industrial performance was the 
centerpiece of both British Labour and French Socialist Strategies. Although in Britain 
the radical measures of control were never carried out, in France such measures were 
implemented. Labour’s policy in Britain had the main feature which was to nationalize at
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least one leading, profitable manufacturing company in each industry and then to direct 
its operations through a National Enterprise Board (NEB). Another feature was the 
planning agreements. This meant that all firms were to present corporate plans. The 
government amended the plans to fit in with overall economic objectives, while leaving 
firms to decide how to carry them out.^^
Since mid-1960s Britain has experienced massive losses in manufacturing in 
inner London and in old northern industrial cities. By mid-1980s, unemployment rates in 
all the manufacturing dependent areas exceeded 15 %. This eventually produced a 
cleavage characterized by widening economic and social disparities. Like Britain, also 
Germany had a North-South disparity. Regional planning policies over the past two 
decades have been designed to reduce the effects of the changes. Different than other 
European countries, in Britain, until 1970s industrial relations was less regulated by law 
than in any other Western country. For example in Germany and France, the business 
sector - to some extent - rely on government legislation to determine the procedures of 
collective bargaining and other related industrial relations. In France, there is the 
Collective Agreements Act 1950 which provides a legal framework for such procedures. 
A similar Agreement also exists in Germany. '^*
Consequently, since World War II, European nations have experienced two fairly 
distinct periods of change. First came a long period of very high and sustained growth 
from the late 1940s through to the early 1970s. This growth narrowed the gap between 
the United States and West Europe in terms of output, that had existed at the start of the
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period. By the late 1960s rapid growth and structural change dominated the scene and the 
old trade cycle depressions were regarded as a thing of the past.^  ^ During this time, 
advanced industrial countries showed a continuous increase of large business in 
employment. Consequently, there were increases in the number of employees as opposed 
to large reductions in the number of the self-employed. According to this argument, the 
history of industrialization can be regarded as one of increasing dependency of labour.^'' 
Second, rising inflation, wage explosions, unrest and political disturbances starting from 
the 1970s were all indications of an economic gloom. During this time commodity 
shortages exchange disturbances, break-up of the Bretton Woods System, oil shocks and 
strong labour resistance to economic adversity all resulted in recession, high inflation, 
rising unemployment and balance of payments and budgetary difficulties.^’
This slow growth was accompanied by a greater degree of convergence among the 
major nations. This in part reflects the closer integration of Western European states 
during the 1980s. By the end of the 1970s the economic picture showed at least some 
improvement. Price inflation had been decreased and the growth of GDP was running at 
around 3 % a year. There was strong investment and in most cases budgetary difficulties 
seemed to be eliminated. “ Commenting on the long recovery from 1982, the U.N. in 
their World Economic Survey for 1990 were encouraged to believe that western nations 
are now on a tract where, barring domestic and external shocks, they can look forward to 
continuing moderate expansion interrupted by no more than, at worst, moderate cyclical 
downturns.”’*^
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However, recession once again took hold of the European states by the end of 
1980s. This recession of the 1990s may be seen as a signal for the collapse of the 
monetarist doctrine. According to Werner Bonefeld, during the last twenty years, the 
development of global credit relations has confirmed Susan Strange’s argument (1971) 
that the breakdown of Bretton Woods has been the most important single development of 
this century, undermining national monetary authority.” Of course, the reasons for this 
recession is quite complicated than any other recession of the 20th century. Political, 
social and cultural transformations as well as the newly forming concept of globalization
all had an impact. 30
4.3 Business and Government Relations in the European Union
The nature of interaction between the government and the business sector is different in 
each country. European Union, on the other hand, having established common policies 
and regulations among its member states, has through the years acquired a certain way of 
dealing with the European businesses. The main features of this relationship in the EU 
can be summarized under three points. First of all, the interaction is not so transparent, 
especially when compared with the United States. Second, most of the procedures that 
take place are done out of public sight. The third point is that, the relations are more 
consensual and less confrontational.
The relationship between the European Community’s Commission and the private 
sector is crucial because the commision has the power to initiate legislation. There is 
intense interaction between business and the Commission . Business frequently uses the
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support of the Commission to further its objectives. The re^tionship with the Parliament 
is far less extensive.
“European bussiness has closely followed the Uruguay Round 
Table trade negotiations, largely through contacts with national 
governments but also through the dialogue between the 
Commission and the European confederation of industryand 
employers federations.” '^
There are also a number of bussiness organizations within the Community that maintains 
contacts with the community institutions. To name the most important ones: 
Eurochambers: Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
European Confederation for the Retail Trade
European Roundtable of Industrialists : Consists of almost fifty leading industrialists. It 
maintains high-level contacts with the Commission and the member states which it uses 
primarily to focus attention on key issues and problems in Europe.
There are other sectoral associations like; the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical_Industries Associations (EFPIA); the European Chemical Industry 
Council {CEPIC)^^
There are also national organizations since the EU institutions are not always 
effective in dealing with regional issues. Concerning the industry, the most important 
ones in Europe are as follows; In Germany, there are two separate ones. The Union of 
German Employers Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutscen
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Arbeitgeberverbaende-BDA); and Association oj Germany Industry (Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie-BDI). In France, these two kinds of associations are united under 
one major heading Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPE). Also in Britain there 
is the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) that does the same activities.
During the relations with the Commission, business takes the initiative in many 
instances and develops support in the Commission. For instance, EC-92 single market 
programme was developed in this way. The initial thrust, or at least much of it, came 
from business sectors that were concerned about Europe’s long-term ability to compete 
in an increasingly global market. There was, for example, a concern expressed by 
European Round Table of Industrialists about infrastructure problems in Europe, which 
led to the development of a legislative programme called 7’rans-European Networks (a 
Europe-wide programme for energy, telecommunications and transportation).^^ In many 
cases, business will seek a solution to a problem that it considers is not being 
appropriately addressed at the national level by turning to the EU. The most intense and 
crucial interaction between the business sector and the European Union takes place on 
the Council level. Since the Council consists of member state representatives, the 
relationship is essentially a national one rather than a European. So, the nature of the 
relationship varies considerably from one country to another.
If one looks at individual states’ business-government relations, a quite differing 
picture emerges in each of the countries. In France the relationship between business and 
government is very close. To a certain extent business accepts guidance from
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government. On the other hand, the government is very attentive to French business 
interests. “France has what is called a unitary trade association system, at the apex of 
which is the Patronat . Made up of eighty federations of associations, the Patronat 
speaks for French Industry, both officially and in regular informal consultations.”^^  
Although its is rather different from the French, Germany also has a close government- 
business relations. There is a measure of responsibility upon the private sector for 
reaching decisions. This pressure to arrive at a consensus is quite strong in the 
government, business and the unions. Officially, the government deals only with the 
associations. On the other hand, individual businessmen or firms are generally less 
involved with the government. The Associations of Germany Industry (BDI) and the 
German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) are the most active ones. They 
maintain a constant relationship with the government. In Britain, the business- 
government relations are far less close than any country on the continent. Traditionally, 
the government holds business at arm’s length. This, also, means that it is less attentive 
to business interests. As a result, this has caused some criticism among some of the
private sector.34
4.4 European Union Industrial Policy
As defined earlier in the introductory part, industrial policy may be generally defined as 
any government measure or set of measures to promote or prevent structural change. 
During the post-war period industrial policies were required in order to foster sectors that 
contributed to Western European states’ economic well-being. Increasingly, the state has
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been given priority to rehabilitate backward regions in an effort to complete national 
recovery and to establish new growth regions in underdeveloped areas. Today, “the 
image of the structure of production that embodied these states' images of themselves led 
inevitably to the continued support of existing advanced industries such as avionics and 
petrochemicals and to the efforts to introduce and develop new industries such as 
computers, nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment facilities and aerospace.”^^  The choice 
of such heavy industries, however, were filled with difficulties. The domestic economies, 
at the time, were too limited to support these sectors. The only way to be profitable and 
competitive was through access to the other world markets. If the states were unable to 
support their industries on the international market, this may mean for them to forgo all
chances of being a superpower.36
In the case of France, the pursuit of international prestige through industrial 
policy had a profound domestic consequence. President de Gaulle's determination in the 
1960s to develop a nuclear capability was so costly for the nation's resources that it had 
certain impacts on industrial policies. The existence of the European Union has allowed 
French policy-makers to create economic concentration to increase the competitiveness 
of French enterprises on the international market. Thus contribute to national prestige 
and domestic economic growth. Consequence of this is that, France had the highest rate 
of mergers than any other European country in the past twenty years, however, this has 
been a policy of encouraging mergers among French firms, not between French and 
foreign ones. “This is clearly a political choice directed against across-frontier 
concentrations that could potentially support more authority for the European community
institutions in Brussels. 1,38
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In all European countries, there exists an extensive set of policies towards 
industry. Industry development is everywhere encouraged with a large variety of sub­
goals of industry policy as well as a long list of instruments. These instruments are 
explained earlier in the chapter. They vary according to their degree of interventionism, 
going from the tax credits, accelerated depreciation and loans at specific rates, to 
subsidies, public share participation and public purchases. Examination of these different 
national policies reveal that the assignment of specific tools to specific aims is not 
always made explicit by the decision maker center. Different degrees of intervention 
have been used in different sectors by specific measures to slow down or to promote 
industrial changes while certain sectors are left relatively untouched. For instance, 
Germany throughout the post-war period has chosen a decentralized approach. It avoided 
any formal detailed plaiming and focused particularly on research and development (R & 
D), and on building up small and medium sized firms. In the 1980s, the German 
authorities have not only intervened in restructuring slow-growth industries but have also 
selectively supported high-technology industries, such as aerospace, computers and other 
national leaders.
On the other hand, France with a comparable level of success, has favored a 
highly centralized approach. Although industrial policy has been largely outside the 
formal planning mechanism, the French approach has been planned in the broad sense.
It has concentrated on particular key sectors and the building up of major national 
companies. During the 80s, French attitude has been more complex than merely 
supporting national champions through indicative planning and voluntarist policy.
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“Underneath the language surrounding the French industrial 
policy, there has been an increasing evidence of a significant 
shift of policy towards a stronger emphasis on the necessity of an 
integrated European market, encouraging a competitive business 
at the international scale, of limiting the existing protectionism, 
and of entering into a process of deregulation.
What is common to the different national industrial policies is their 
interventionism; what mainly differs is the style. The thing that matters is the 
compatibility of the public strategy. The agents whom it must work with through 
consensus forming is also an important and integral part of any effective industrial policy. 
Without basic agreements between government officials and business and labor leaders 
on the overall course of such policy, there is no possibility of success. However some 
European countries achieve this consensus through an industrial policy that is based upon 
a recognition of the indigenous factors within the country that enable a consensus to be 
reached.“*' The French, for example, are able to build a consensus on industrial policy 
because of their strongly centralized political and economic structure and the existence of 
a managerial elite that moves readily between high-level positions in government and 
industry. These graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and the Ecole Poly­
technique provide France with a cadre of top managers, which makes it easier to achieve 
and implement consensus. The Germans, on the other hand, achieve consensus through 
their great concentration of economic power among a small number of banks and major 
industries. German banks own sizable shares on German industiy and the boards of 
directors of the banks and large companies are tightly interlocked. Such a combination
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provides a ready framework for consensus formation on broad issues of industrial
policy.42
There has developed in recent years a new attribute of government which is 
industrial policy in a narrower sense and which can be defined as any selective 
government measure, or set of measures, to prevent or to promote structural change on a 
specific ad hoc basis. Thus, modem industrial policy aims at more than merely setting a 
general framework. It descends increasingly into the microeconomic sphere of economic 
decision taking that was formerly left to the price mechanism.''^
Governments are frequently concerned about the leading national industries. This 
has led to political intervention to establish firms in key areas even when such policies 
are overridden by economic considerations. The role of the EU in this respect -in 
formulating sectoral policies- has been minimal, since it does not have the authority, 
organization or stmcture to influence individual national efforts. Nine-tenths of all 
industry policy measures take place at the national level, the role of the EU is, therefore, 
a coordinator of national policies, of a promoter of cooperation at the European level and 
of an investigator of measures favoring the flexibility of the economic structure. It 
remains necessary to harmonize national regulations. The possibility to adopt regulations 
would give the EU more flexibility in this field. However, in a declaration the member 
states have stated that harmonization involves the amendment of existing national 
regulations in one or more member states.'*'*
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As stated earlier in the study, the Rome Treaty did not achieve much for European 
industry. A competitive impetus to induce a natural adjustment of the industry was to be 
provided through the abolition of internal tariffs and trade barriers and the creation of a 
common internal market. It was stated that free trade is a sufficient device for an optimal 
allocation of resources. Therefore, the activities covered by the Rome Treaty are 
heterogeneous, however the problems encountered by the industry are very diverse. 
Competition policy is the only area of industrial policy where some notable progress has 
been achieved before the Single European Act (SEA). It covers a wide range of 
industrial activities including price setting and monopoly control, activities of public 
sector industries, state aid, MNC’s and restrictions on imports and exports. In its first 
annual report on the development of competition policy the commission stated the 
following as its attitude towards the issue:
“Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since it 
guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all. An 
active competition policy pursued in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties establishing the Communities makes it 
easier for the supply and demand structures continually to adjust 
to technological development.
... The community’s policy must, in the first place, prevent 
governmental restrictions and barriers-which have been 
abolished-from being replaced by similar measures of a private 
nature. Agreements an quotas as well as agreements for the
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purpose of dividing the Common Market into regions, or of 
dividing up or fragmenting markets by other means are in 
flagrant contradiction to the provisions of the Treaties.
Today, while at the theoretical level, there is an everlasting debate between those which 
place their confidence in the virtues of competition in order to allocate resources 
efficiently and those who advocate a systematic control of industrial development, 
industrial policy has to tocus on flexibility which constitutes a determinant advantage in 
the competitive game. A major victory for competition was the decision, by the Industry 
Ministers on 22nd February 1990, to open up the Community’s market for public 
purchasing to cross-border competition. Western European countries had hoped that 
market integration would lead to greater economic growth for the member states and 
make their industries more competitive internationally. They expected that this would 
assist them in dealing with the problems of structural change caused by the changing 
patterns of international competition and trade.“*^
From the beginning of the 1980s, member states have become increasingly aware 
of the rigidities arising from the fragmentation of the internal market. In 1985, the 
procedural modifications brought by the Single European Act concerning the industrial 
policy are only optimal and not compulsory. Faced with such changes the companies 
will need to adopt their structures and push through the required changes so that they can 
operate in an open, competitive and multicultural environment. In order to make this 
adaptation as smooth as possible certain strategies are implemented by the EU. Policy­
makers of the Community have realized that their actions will have a major influence on
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the development and performance of industry. However, it is up to the industry itself to 
create the right conditions for the optimum allocation of resources promoting rapid 
structural adjustment and to improve their industrial competitiveness.'*^
On January 1990, the EU Industry Ministers agreed on a directive proposal to 
extend the Community procurement rules to four important sectors: energy, transport, 
water and telecommunications. A mildly protectionist Buy Europe clause was included 
in this directive. This clause will be removed if the GATT talks succeed in lifting such 
preferences worldwide. It remains necessary to harmonize national regulations. The 
possibility to adopt regulations would give the community more flexibility in this field. 
However, in a declaration the Member states have stated that harmonization involves the 
amendment of existing national regulations in one or more member states. Still, as 
stated by Shearman, “European collaboration is on the agenda because governments 
wish to retain their strategic interests at either national or European level in particular
sectors of industries •)t4S
EU has developed its concept for industrial policy in the Commission’s 
communication entitled Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment 
given to the Council and the European Parliament on 30 October 1990. In this Paper 
there were two main objectives: to improve the operations of the internal market as well 
as the world markets and to pursuepositive structural adjustment policies. The industrial 
framework to be created on a European scale contain the following elements;
i) maintaining a macroeconomic structure directed towards stability.
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ü) strengthening the activities of firms in the fields of research and development,
iii) strengthening the competitiveness of enterprises in less developed regions and the 
promotion of new business formation,
iv) implementing effective policies to develop human resources,
v) supporting a high level of environmental protection,
vi) supporting the trans-European networks required for the proper functioning of the 
internal market,
vii) ensuring close observation of industrial development to make sure that the necessary 
requirements for adjustment are met/'^
Since 1990 these basic principles have been applied in various industrial policy 
initiatives taken by the Commission. For instance, in the case of the motor industry a 
balance has been sought to make Europe more competitive during the transition period 
set by the arrangement with Japan. In biotechnology, the objective is to make the 
Community as attractive as its rivals while taking due account of the needs to protect 
public health and the environment. New fields of activity related to the information 
society and cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe.
One of the most important efforts within the European industrial policy is the 
technology policy backed by the Commission and all the high-tech firms, i.e. Philips, 
Siemens, Thomson. These massive research and technology programs have received
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approximately $3 billion annually from government funding alone. Plus, there is the 
private sectors’ funding towards R & D programs which is more or less the same 
amount.^' The Community Council of Ministers has approved several programs which 
should allow the Community to develop new technologies on different grounds;
ESPIUT ( European strategic program for information technologies). This was a 
five year program that was to help Europe to respond to the challenge of foreign 
competition in information technology.
RACE (Research and development in advanced communications technologies for 
Europe). This program also includes activities in the standards and infrastructures field 
and is intended to help Europe to remain in the telecommunications industry
BRITE (Basic research in industrial technologies for Europe). This program was 
organized and financed on the Esprit model. It aims to encourage the development and 
spread of new technologies, new processes of manufacture and new products.
A research program in biotechnology. This program covers a key sector. The aim 
is to stimulate research and also training in areas such as bio-informatics, the collection 
of biotic materials, the basic technology of genetic engineering.
The EUREKA program provides a model for wider cooperation with new
partners using new forms of finance and management.52
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The achievement of a Community technology policy will demand much greater 
coordination of national and Community research efforts. More action is needed to 
improve the translation of these research program results into marketable products. The 
Commission’s programs for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also very 
important. They have a decisive role to play as suppliers, co-makers, fast innovators and 
job creators.
The consensus reached on the principles set out in the 1990 communication 
indicated that it is primarily up to the member states and the decentralized authorities to 
foster industrial competitiveness with the aid of a system of open and competitive 
markets. There is a need to create a healthy competitive environment in which the 
companies can “groom themselves for the global challenge.”
4.5 European Industry
Among the three sectors; Agriculture, Industry and Service, industry accounts for nearly 
35 % of all employment in the EU. Industrial production grew during the thirty years 
following the Second World War. However, the growth rate has slowed down since 
1974. Tensions are innate to the industrial order. They happen from technology scale, 
organization, efficiency and uncertainty.^^ European industry experienced two slumps, 
one in 1975 and the other in 1980-82. These mainly happened because of oil crises that 
forced up energy costs.
Since 1983, industrial production has recorded sustained growth. At the end of 
the decade it has reached 4 % per year; and going even higher in some of the sectors
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which had home the full impact of the recession, i.e. iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
textiles. These sectors had been obliged to undertake large-scale restructuring programs. 
During the same period, the level of industrial employment fell steadily and only started 
to stabilize at the end of the decade. Industry in the European Union has lost ground 
against US and particularly Japanese industry over the last decade. Higher productivity is 
an indication of improvements in a country's standard of living and level of 
competitiveness. The annual growth in the productivity of EU industry was slightly 
higher than in the US (3.4 % as against 3.2 %) but appreciably lower than in Japan (5.5
%).56
The picture is much more encouraging today. Though still, most assessments of 
EU industry continue to emphasize its worrying loss of competitiveness compared with 
its main competitors. Certain macroeconomic factors show that the Union is in a 
disadvantageous position; though these factors may not always take into account all the 
relative data. For instance, these aggregated average figures for the Union do not take 
account of the relative situation of the Member States. Another factor which is not 
usually taken into account is the growing importance of service industries. The service 
sector is estimated to account for over 60 % of the added-value and employment 
generated by total EU production. Also, these variables “cannot reflect certain 
fundamental elements underlying all competitive performance: the microeconomic 
dimension, the enterprise spirit, individual effort, the commercial approach of individual 
companies and the dynamism of subsidiaries and clusters of companies.”^^
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Table: 4 Structural adjustment in the context of 
industrial policy
1. Preliminaries 
Competition 
Economic context 
Level of training 
Economic and social cohesion 
Environmental protection
2. Catalysts 
Internal market 
Trade policy
3. Accelerators
Research, development, technology, innovation 
Small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs)
Business services
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities. Europe in 
figures. (Brussels: Official Publications of the EC, 1992)
A general opinion among the industry is that there is no one single factor to 
Europe's relative decline; likewise there is no single solution. Several of the leading
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factors that contribute to this decline - in addition to the well-known elements like 
deterioration of the balance of trade, exchange rate appreciation, lower growth rate, lack 
of flexibility of the human factor - are as follows; i) hourly pay rates have increased, ii) 
the tax burden averages 40 % in the EU, which is higher than both USA and Japan, and 
iii) there are deficiencies in the promotion of physical and intangible investments by 
companies (especially small and medium-sized ones) and weaknesses in management 
expertise. As for the solutions, some industrialists propose the adaptation of a series of 
policies designed to improve the macroeconomic environment and in order to make 
markets work more efficiently. There are also certain local development strategies being 
used; the main emphasis is on actually training people and not on incentives of wider 
nature. So training is used as a vehicle for local social and economic development.^*  ^
Some regions of the Community are much more highly industrialized than others. 
According to a study, the Community’s weakest and most vulnerable manufacturing 
plants and firms are those located in its peripheral regions.
In general, the EU industry has focused its drive to regain competitiveness on 
costs and productivity. The world competitiveness report 1993 shows that eight member 
states are among the top 10 OECD members in terms of growth in GDP per employee 
with rates nearing or exceeding 2 % a year. Only Germany experienced negative growth 
as a result of unification (-2.33 %). “It was a common belief that the integration of the 
European market would allow the firms to realize the desired scale economies without 
undue concentration and market p o w e r . T h u s  European industrial policies in the 
1960s sought to exploit the link between size and competitiveness by promoting the 
creation of firms large enough to compete with outside competitors. So they
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implemented weak anti-merger laws, and governments occasionally supported particular 
mergers. All these resulted in a merger boom which transferred the corporate economy 
in the 1960s. This merger boom consisted predominantly of horizontal mergers between 
competing firms in the same industry. This led to a substantial increase of concentration 
in European industry. In 1976, the 100 largest firms in the Community accounted for 
about 30 % of the output and employment and about 30 % of EC exports were internal 
transactions carried out within these 100 f i r ms . Th e  major problem of European 
industry in the early 1980s was the slowdown of improvement in productivity. The 
reason as given in the European Report was inadequate productive investment. As a 
result, while competitiveness declined, labor costs increased (by an average of 8.7% per 
year between 1960 - 1980). Following this, European Union companies targeted their 
productivity drive on reducing the labor costs.
The production labor cost is falling in most products and services, other factors as 
development, industrialization, control and distribution costs are rising. This drive for 
cost competitiveness has sometimes pushed these enterprises to relocate in regions with 
comparative advantages. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of the EU firms and their 
relocation strategies show that these are pursued to improve their position on growth 
markets rather than substitution strategies (these strategies mean production intended 
for re-exportation to Europe).
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Table: 5 Foreign Direct Investment in the European Community
1991 ECU billion
Total FDI 57.1
In other member states 32.5
DOutside the Union 24.6
In non-OECD countries 9.4
In Asia 3.6
Total national investment 
of the four* states 707.5
* France, Germany, Netherlands, Britain.
Percentage
100
57
43
16
Source: Bulletin of the EU. An Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the EU
(Brussels:Coramission of the EU, 1994), 43.
Increased industrialization of the economy and changes in the international 
division of labor put a heavy burden on traditional export markets. This pushed the 
industrial countries to specialize in high value-added products. In order to “divert away 
from traditional lines of activity and to develop techniques and products appropriate for 
varying factor prices and shifting grounds of comparative advantage.”*"^ As technology 
and industrialization become more uniformly applied the countries involved will tend, 
over an extended period, to develop more similar industrial features.^^
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Table: 6 Gross value-added at market prices by branch of industry 
(as % of total value-added of manufactoring industry)
“  Food products 15.2
*  Electric and electronic engineering 14.0
Transport equipment 12.1
™  Chemicals 11.5
■ 1 Machinery and mechanical eqipment 9.6
H  Metal products 7.5
H  Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear 6.7
*  Paper, paper products, printing and publishing 6.3
■■ Non-metalic minerals 4.4
*  Rubber and processing plastics 4.2
™  Metal working industries (incl. Iron and steel) 3.9
** Timber and wooden furniture 2.6
*  Precision, optical and similar instruments 1.3
** Other manufactoring industries 0.7
SolU'ce: J. Hughes and M. Unger.The New Europe:An Encyclopedic Atlas (LondoniMitchell 
Beazley Int., 1991), 168.
4.5.0. Steel Industry:
Among the main heavy industries of Europe, steel has a special place. The steel industry 
used to be an important index of the relative wealth and stage of development of any
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particular country. It is traditionally a major employer of labour and requires high capital 
investment. Steel is a basic material which is used in almost every part of industry, 
therefore it is greatly involved in modem industry matters.®“* The European Community 
is one of the world’s major steel producers. On the continent, the industry is almost 
entirely based upon the “heav>· industrial triangle” which is the Ruhr, the Nord/Pas de 
Calais and Sambre-Meuse.
By the 1950s two new factors came into the scene which affected the further 
development of the steel industry. First is the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC); second is the technological changes. These two factors substantially changed 
patterns of location and structure. The ECSC came into effect in July 1952 mainly as a 
common market in coal, steel, iron-ore, scrap, pig-iron and coke. As a result of the 
abolition of frontier tariffs, national subsidies and transport rate discrimination, 
interdependence and intercommunity trade greatly increased. The ECSC has been 
responsible for large reductions in transport costs across frontiers and for smoothing out
cost variations between member states 65
At the end of the 1970s a restructuring of the industry began. It was carried out 
through takeovers, mergers, the closure of unproductive plants and the reduction of 
production capacity. This restmcturing, together with the help of the fall in energy costs, 
helped improve the profitability of companies in this sector, especially after the second 
half of the 1980s. In 1990, the Community iron and steel industry produced 136.9 million 
tonnes of crude steel and employed 379,400 people. Despite an undeniable improvement
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in the quality of the steel produced, the industry has to cope with rising production 
costs, falling demand from consumer sectors and a reduction in specific steel
consumption.
Table: 7 EU iron and steel production in 1990 (mio t)
Pig iron 91.7
Crude steel 136.9
Rolled finished products 116.6
Source: “European Steel Monster,” Economist (May 9,1992), 89-90.
4.5,b. Chemical Industry:
The European Union is the world’s largest producer of chemical products and at ECU 
292 billion (1990) of its chemical industry had a higher total turnover than its 
counterparts. It comes fourth in the table of EU manufacturing industries and accounts 
for over 11% of industry’s total value-added. Germany, France and the Netherlands are 
the largest producers of basic chemicals and plastics. Britain and Italy lead the way in 
pharmaceuticals and other consumer chemical products. Chemical industry is a major 
consumer of petroleum products, thus it tends to be vulnerable to fluctuations in oil 
prices. During the second oil crisis, to resolve the problems of over-capacity investment 
was done; to improve productivity, introduce new manufacturing processes and new 
products, to achieve safety and environmental protection, and to mechanize plants.^^
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T ab le: 8 Main indicators for the EU chemical industry
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Apparent consumption
(MioECU) 226 040 211 102 222 605 248 413 270 259 279 430
Net exports 18 678 15 466 15 049 15 283 13 643 11 158
Production 244 718 226 567 237 654 263 696 283 902 290588
Employment
(1000)
1 759 1 752 1 752 1 739 1 745 1771
Source. J. Hughes and M. Unger.lT^ e New Europe:An Encyclopedic Atlas (London:Mitchell 
Beazleyint., 1991), 180.
4.5.C Textile Industry:
This sector of industry includes textiles, clothing, leather and footwear. These industries 
as all the rest went into decline in the 1970s. During the 1980s, through heavy 
restructuring with the introduction of high-performance machinery, there was a 
substantial increase in productivity. This can mainly be explained by the restructuring of 
the industry. It affected every country in the European Union to varying degrees. Since 
there was stiff foreign competition from low-wage countries, the EU aimed at reducing 
capacity and modernizing its industry. It acted in two ways: i) it moved to control 
national aid as early as 1971, and ii) it provided aid for its own restructuring measures. 
These aids assisted commercial cooperation and provided modernization by means of 
loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and intervention by the European 
Research and Development Fund (ERDF) and the Social Fund. The Multi-fibre
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Agreement, signed in 1973 within the framework of GATT, is an additional part of a
wider strategy.71
This Agreement to promote exports from the developing countries to the EU was 
renewed again for a period of seventeen months at the end of July 1991. The outlook is 
conditioned by increased competition both inside the EU and from non-member states. 
Also, opening up of Central and Eastern Europe, offers new markets, but they are also a 
source of competition on account of their tow production costs.^^
4.5.d. Service Sector:
In the broad sense service industries include both market services, i.e. repairs, commerce, 
catering, accommodation, transport, banking, insurance) and non-market services, i.e. 
health care, education, research, social welfare, public services. In terms of total added- 
value and jobs, this sector accounts for almost two-thirds of the EU economy. Since 
1980, the added-value of services have increased by 8.7% per year. In terms of jobs there 
is also an increase. In 1990, nearly two-thirds of EU jobs were in service-related 
activities (about eighty million people in ten member states); whereas in other industries 
(agriculture and manufacturing) there is a decrease in employment from 1980 to 1990. In
the services sector there is an increase of 1.9% per year in employment.7.1
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Chapter V
CONCLUSION
Although tied to agreements and certain treaties, the industrial policy of the EU is 
essentially an uncoordinated and underdeveloped. A fully developed, comprehensive and 
coherent industrial policy does not exist. Instead, there are large number of policies, 
themselves usually only partially developed, which affect the industry. These do not 
constitute an integrated industrial framework with clear and consistent goals. The broad 
framework of the policy, produced by the Commission in 1990, was entitled Industrial 
Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a Community Approach. 
This paper was followed by a series of other papers applying principles to various 
troubled sectors and concerning industrial competitiveness and environmental 
regulations. Through these papers the Commission tried to show that it sought a 
noninterventionist approach. Predictably, the Commission’s paper was not liked by 
many in the private and public sector who wanted outright financial assistance and 
protection. However there was a coalition of member states that supported the EU’s 
position (Britain, Spain, Ireland). Eventually, the Council adapted certain resolutions 
along the lines of the Commission’s standing which was especially strengthened by the
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etTorts of Martin Bangemann and Sir Leon Brittan.' Still, subsequent papers are met 
with debates from all sides.
Reflecting the ongoing debate on industrial policy, the Maastricht Treaty 
contained a new title on the topic (Article 30). Though these provisions are vague and too 
general, calling on the Community and its member states “to ensure that the conditions 
needed to make Community industry competitive are met in a system of open and 
competitive markets.”  ^To achieve its aims of structural adjustment, the treaty stipulates 
that the Council “may adopt specific measures in support of action taken by member 
states.”  ^ However, The Council may only act unanimously; which denies the 
Community more authority in the area of industrial policy.
Hence, the domination of the national governments in conducting industrial 
policies continued till this day despite the establishment of the EU. This trend’s 
beginning can be traced back to World War II when the allocation of credits among 
industries constituted a sector-specific approach to reindustrialization. Afterward, none 
of the aid receiving governments renounced measures designed to shape the industrial 
structure of their economies. The French, through their Commissariat du Plan, adopted 
detailed industrial policies. The Germans, though ideologically inclined to rely on 
market-promoting industrial policies, also intervened into certain sectors, like coal, 
aerospace and telematics."  ^ The British have adapted both types of policies represented 
by France and Germany. Mainly, it never attempted full industrial planning, but 
implemented sector-specific policies while proclaiming allegiance to economic 
liberalism.’
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Once the Western economies reached levels of prosperity, the social 
committments of European governments acted to ensure that industrial policies would 
continue to be an important part of their activities. The European welfare democracies 
established social bargains that included two main parts: redistribution of national 
income in favor of the economically weak and protection of employment. Thus, 
European governments have spent a higher share of their national product on social 
welfare than have American or Japanese governments. A prime objective of the elected 
governments in Europe therefore became the economic growth needed to pay for social 
programs and maintain employment.^
However, today the expenditures to sustain a welfare state are much higher for 
Europe with nearly eighteen million unemployed. This problem brings with itself the 
issues of privatization and the relations with trade unions. Privatization, in Western 
Europe must be seen as part of a much wider industrial policy response in the 
restructuring of the relationship between state, market and society which has 
characterized the politics of these states since the early 1980s. Privatization can be 
described as a wide range of policies designed to reduce the scope, limit the functions 
and generally weaken the influence of the public sector. Among the European Union 
members, Britain has adopted the widest approach to privatization. “It accounted for 
nearly a third of the total assets privatized in the world between 1984 - 1991.”  ^ The 
French privatization programme from 1986 to 1988 was in some respects even more 
radical than the one in Britain, however, this process weakened with Prime Minister 
Rocard and later by Prime Ministers Cresson and Beregovay. Since, 1993, the process of 
privatization accelerated though could not reached the promised proposals of the new
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Right-wing government that came to office. Plans for privatization have also been 
announced by German governments where the Kohl government has disposed of the 
state’s stake in certain industries like energy, chemicals, steel and engineering industries. 
Recently, the German government has even pushed along negotiations with the Social 
Democratic opposition with a view to privatizing German Telekom.*
European Union’s limitations on government subsidies also induced many 
industrial firms to invest, the acquisition of foreign subsidiaries, or joint ventures. For 
instance, France’s cross-border trade with Germany is increasing rapidly, some French 
companies investing directly in East Germany, others setting up German subsidiaries 
and/or establishing Franco-German joint ventures. Hence, French industry is gradually 
shedding its protectionist image in favor of free trade and there seems to be an emphasis 
on the competition policy and privatization.^
Another topic for current debate in industrial policy is the raising unemployment. 
As the privatization and foreign direct investment programs take the lead, industrial 
relations become a harder problem to deal with. The importance of trade unions 
becomes ever more apparent as this issue heightens. On the other hand, a new dimension 
to industrial relations has came about as Europe further steps towards social and 
economic integration. This, eventually, has been diminishing the importance of national 
platforms in which confederations are represented. General and political representation 
will increasingly have to be addressed to Brussels. European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), formed 1973, covers eighteen countries and some forty million 
trade unionists both inside and outside Europe. One of the main problems of the ETUC is
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that its mandate is derived from leading federations which are themselves in the process 
of weakening.
“The extreme diversity of European union confederations, their 
internal rivalries, differences in organization and rivalries, 
differences in organization and ideology, the absence of a dominant 
union centre able and trusted to fulfill a leadership role, and the 
non-availability of a European target organization of employers 
whose coordination abilities must be paralleled, are as many 
obstacles on the road to transnational unionism in Europe.”'*^
The development of a single European economy within the European Union will 
change the pattern of such industrial relations and encourage experiments with new 
policy instruments. In recent years, the European Union (the Commission) is favoring 
emphasis on direct consultation with industry and try to reach agreement on industrial 
relations, technical norms, future market development and other relevant matters. This 
approach seems to be effective, although the drawback is that it may be at cross purpose 
with the European Competition Policy, since as far as the industrial policy is concerned, 
the attitude of the EU has been fairly non-interventionist regulating the process of 
structural change by competition policy.''
Although non-interventionist in most situations, EU policies towards new 
technologies embody a twin-track approach. For instance, there are the supportive, 
interventionist policies of ESPRIT, RACE and the EUREKA on one side, and the 
liberal, competitive, deregulatory approach of the Single Market on the other. After
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Maastricht, the Community continues to pursue an active R & D policy, based on 
ESPRIT and other programs.'^ However, The Community’s R & D programs appear 
increasingly inadequate within the industrial policy context.
“Despite the Commission’s recent Communications on general and sector- 
specific support, and despite the Maastricht Treaty’s new title on the subject, industrial 
policy remains a pressing issue in the Community.” '^  Increasingly, Europe becomes more 
open economically, expanding global corporate alliances and faster technological 
obsolescence and at a time like this politicians and industrial representatives must not 
avoid each other. Both have separate responsibilities which should not be confused. 
“Industrial policy must be conducted purposefully and not simply be a result of political
coincidences. ,14
Industrial policy is one of those rather unusual areas of potential economic policy 
activity around which a broad range of issues crystallize. Indeed, this is one of the main 
problems with industrial policy. It seems to attract too many potential objectives. It 
becomes strained with policy initiatives and is called upon to solve problems that either 
are not within its scope or which it just can not be properly developed to address with the 
tools of industrial policy. This policy, thus, characterized by too many objectives and not 
enough instruments. For instance, it can be required at times to solve unemployment 
problems, problems of regional development, social welfare issues and housing policy 
amongst others. In addition tax and fiscal policy can substitute for industrial policy, as 
can domestic and international competitiveness and trade policy, training policy and 
privatization policy.'^
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Therefore, what tends to happen with industrial policy is that it blends together 
and/or gets substituted by with this range of other policy areas. This makes explaining the 
domain of the industrial policy rather difficult. However, one must do this if strategic 
considerations of the way this policy is to be articulated to these other areas are to be 
more clearly made. Hence, the issue is not total divorce of industrial policy from the 
other specified policies, but rather to suggest its prior analytical seperation and draw a
clear framework. 16
So an industrial policy should be developed and implemented as a coherent 
framework. It would have to be constantly adapted to keep it in line with the dynamics of 
European and world trends, in a process of ongoing consultation between politicians and 
industrialists. The Community is faced with the task to preserve and promote the 
competitiveness of European industry at home and abroad. Although the Treaty on 
European Union conferred responsibility for industrial policy on the Community, treaty 
provision is no guarantee of policy development.'^
Today, the measures taken to implement industrial policy are facing a series of 
new factors:
i) Since the early 1980s there is a persistent increase in unemployment rates, this 
reduces the capacity to implement the changes necessary to boost industrial 
competitiveness throughout the Union.
ii) There are now clear signs that the world-wide recession of the early 1990s is being 
overcome. The EU should more strictly than ever take into account the changes in the
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international context marked by geopolitical upheaval, the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and the decision to establish a World Trade Organization.
iii) The emergence of new technologies, essentially the ones associated with information 
society have certain repercussions for the industry. This impact is most heavily felt in 
the heavy industries of Europe: steel and coal. These particular sectors have been slow to 
make the necessary structural changes and now their situation is much troubled than any 
other sector within the industry. Since, by the 1980s technology policy had been tightly 
linked to industrial policies favoring leading sectors. According to the OECD report in 
1985, member states’ technology policies have been increasingly focusing on industrial 
policy objectives. The major concern of these policies is the international
competitiveness 18
iv) “Environmentally sustainable development implies, as stressed in the Commission’s 
communication on industrial competitiveness and environmental protection, that 
environmental quality and growth must be considered interdependent. 
Environmental policy of the European Union cannot be separated from industrial 
policies. The Commission has introduced a variety of new instruments for this policy. 
They all have one element in common:
“they set incentives to force the polluter to become aware of the 
environmental impacts of his activities and to internalize them in
his cost calculations 5^20
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v) Problems of relocation and the relations between big businesses and their 
subcontractors are becoming more important as economies grow increasingly 
interdependent. The competitiveness of businesses in the EU is becoming more and more
21sensitive to their rivals’ industrial strategies.
There is no doubt that the Community’s industrial policy has come a long way. 
Although it tends to be organized in a cumberous and aloof manner, it has gained 
legitimacy since its explicit inclusion in the 1987 Single European Act. The driving force 
behind this rapid development is the single market project. European governments and 
industrialists while recognizing the need for a single market are worried that competitors 
of European firms will lead the way and gain all the profits. Therefore, the general aims 
are set out as encouraging transnational inter-firm cooperation and supporting high 
technology R & D. Still the foreign competitive forces should be allowed to operate in 
Europe and the companies should not be shielded from their impact. European firms 
should be encouraged to seek out partners in the United States, Japan, or other parts of 
the world. It should not be that European firms looking for European technologies 
among European partners. If Europe must have an industrial policy, it should be an 
open one. World is already too globalized to endorse any other approach.
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